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INTRODUCTION
Ronald Coase transformed our understanding of the role of transaction costs in
the economic and legal systems. In a way, it can be said that he invented the
modern discipline of law and economics.1 He was also a creature of his times. His
education was steeped in British and Continental economics and law.2 He studied at
the London School of Economics (LSE) in the late 1920s and early 1930s, during
its heyday under the leadership of Lionel Robbins.3 The London School of
Economics had been founded in 1895, making it a very young upstart among
British universities. The dominant British economic thinking of the time was
coming mainly from Cambridge University. In large part, Robbins’s leadership of
LSE in the 1930s was dedicated to breaking the hold that the Cambridge School

† Copyright © 2011 Herbert Hovenkamp.
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, University of Iowa College of Law.
1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 23 (6th ed. 2003) (noting
that the “new law and economics” began with Ronald Coase’s The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter Coase, Problem of Social Cost], and Guido Calabresi’s
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961)).
2. See RONALD H. COASE, Economics at LSE in the 1930s: A Personal View, in
ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 208 (1994) [hereinafter COASE, Economics at LSE];
see also A.W. Coats, The Distinctive LSE Ethos in the Inter-War Years, 10 ATLANTIC ECON.
J. 18, 21 (1982).
3. Lord Lionel Robbins was chair of political economy at LSE from 1929 until 1961.
Coase described Robbins as “the most influential figure of all” at LSE in the 1930s. COASE,
Economics at LSE, supra note 2, at 211; see also WILLIAM H. BEVERIDGE, THE LONDON
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND ITS PROBLEMS, 1919–1937 (1960); ELIZABETH DURBIN, NEW
JERUSALEMS: THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE ECONOMICS OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM 101–36
(1985); LIONEL ROBBINS, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN ECONOMIST 105–31 (1971).
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(chiefly Alfred Marshall, Arthur Cecil Pigou, and later, Joan Robinson) had over
neoclassical economic theory in the early twentieth century.4
Except for two periods away, Coase remained at LSE until he emigrated to the
United States in 1951.5 During the time Coase was at LSE, the school was forging a
name for itself in the development of economic theory and welfare economics,
under such scholars as Robbins, John Hicks, Paul Sweezy, Abba Lerner, Nicholas
Kaldor, and Tibor Scitovsky.6 By his own admission, Coase spent more time
studying law than economics, and his obsession was figuring out how institutions
in the real world operate.7
Coase has occasionally identified himself with the group of economists called
“institutionalists,”8 although there is scant evidence that he took any of the first
generation of institutionalists very seriously. Today, however, many of Coase’s
followers describe their discipline as “new institutional economics.”9

4. See Nahid Aslanbeigui, On the Demise of Pigovian Economics, 56 S. ECON. J. 616
(1990); Roger E. Backhouse, Robbins and Welfare Economics: A Reappraisal, 31 J. HIST.
ECON. THOUGHT 474 (2009). On the relationships of Pigou, Robbins, and Coase, see Nahid
Aslanbeigui, Introduction to ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, at li–lx
(Transaction Publishers 2002) (1932); Nahid Aslanbeigui & Steven G. Medema, Beyond the
Dark Clouds: Pigou and Coase on Social Cost, 30 HIST. POL. ECON. 601 (1998); Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 633 (2009)
[hereinafter Hovenkamp, Coase Theorem]; Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Steven G. Medema,
Ronald Coase, the British Tradition, and the Future of Economic Method, in COASEAN
ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 209 (Steven G.
Medema ed., 1998). On Marshall and the Cambridge School, see Peter D. Groenewegen,
Alfred Marshall and the Establishment of the Cambridge Economic Tripos, 20 HIST. POL.
ECON. 627 (1988).
5. Coase took a Bachelor of Commerce degree at LSE in 1932 and was on its teaching
staff from 1935 to 1951, except for an assignment as a government statistician during World
War II; he also made a visit to the United States in 1931 and 1932, where he collected
observations for his article The Nature of the Firm. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm:
Origin, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Coase, Nature of the Firm: Origin].
6. For a good history of the principal faculty and most famous students at LSE, see the
website at http://homepage.newschool.edu/het//schools/lse.htm. For John Hicks’s
perspective, see JOHN HICKS, Introductory: LSE and the Robbins Circle, in 2 MONEY,
INTEREST AND WAGES: COLLECTED ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC THEORY 3 (Harvard Univ. Press
1982).
7. See Coase, Nature of the Firm: Origin, supra note 5, at 6 (recalling that in his years
at LSE as a student he took no courses in economics and spent most of his time studying
law, particularly “industrial law”).
8. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, Nobel Prize Lecture, The Institutional Structure of
Production (Dec. 9, 1991) [hereinafter Coase, Nobel Prize Lecture], available at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1991/coase-lecture.html; see also
Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 72 (1998) [hereinafter
Coase, New Institutional Economics].
9. See L.J. Alston, New Institutional Economics, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlaf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008), available at
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_N000170; see also OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 3–10, 322–48 (1995).
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Although the diversity of its adherents makes a definition elusive,
“institutionalism” historically refers to a group of mainly American economists
whose work stretched from the beginning of the twentieth century until after the
New Deal.10 Their place in economic theory is somewhat outside the mainstream,11
but they have recently experienced a resurgence with the rise of interest in
behavioral economics and socioeconomics.12 This first generation of
institutionalists emphasized the importance of human-created institutions that serve
to allocate power or resources, the rules that these institutions develop and employ,
and their effect in the overall economy. The old institutionalists generally rejected
the neoclassical notion that preferences (value) must simply be accepted as
asserted. Most of them were far more interested in examining the sources of human
preferences, emphasizing their links with either evolutionary biology or behaviorist
psychology. Unlike mainstream neoclassicists, who tended to reduce economics to
the study of markets, the institutionalists believed that voluntary market exchange
is only one of many institutions that move resources through society.13
This paper examines the relationship of Ronald Coase’s thought to
neoclassicism and institutionalism. The first generation of institutionalists rejected
or severely qualified marginalist analysis, as well as the emergent neoclassical
creed that the study of naked individual preference is the exclusive methodology of
economic science. They came to believe that in a world in which resources are
scarce and their movement is costly, a variety of institutions emerge for
determining the course of movement by forcing individuals to make tradeoffs.14
Coase’s most important work seemed to merge neoclassicism with certain
elements of institutionalism by incorporating marginalist analysis into the study of
institutions.15 Like other neoclassicists, he was not concerned about the source of
preferences but only with the mechanisms by which they are asserted.16 More
explicitly, by recognizing individual preference orderings and market exchange as
the principal movers of resources, Coase reduced the problem of resource
movement to one of “transaction costs.”17 While he barely acknowledged the

10. See MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 700–03 (5th ed. 1995);
GEOFFREY M. HODGSON, THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: AGENCY,
STRUCTURE AND DARWINISM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONALISM (2004) (tracing the history of
American Institutionalism).
11. Nonetheless, the old institutionalists continue to publish journals, including The
Journal of Economic Issues and the Journal of Institutional Economics. Several scholarly
organizations support their work, including the Association for Evolutionary Economics. See
ASS’N FOR EVOLUTIONARY ECON., http://www.associationforevolutionaryeconomics.org/
divison.php?page=institutional_economics&sub=associations.
12. See,
e.g.,
THE
JOURNAL
OF
SOCIO-ECONOMICS,
http://ideas.repec.org/s/eee/soceco.html.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 123–24.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 162–69.
16. This statement seems quite true, notwithstanding that in an essay on new
institutional economics, Coase specifically acknowledged “the work of our colleagues in
law, anthropology, sociology, political science, sociobiology, and other disciplines.” Coase,
New Institutional Economics, supra note 8, at 72.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 168–69.
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existence of the first generation of institutionalists, Coase nevertheless shared with
them a focus on the movement of resources in very small markets.18 The result was
a new brand of institutionalism that was far more palatable to neoclassicists but
largely unacceptable to traditional institutionalists.19 Today New Institutional
Economics (NIE) occupies a prominent position within the mainstream of
economic thought.20
This revised brand of institutionalism has been a principal intellectual source of
theory for modern law and economics. The problem with neoclassicism, outside
from Pigou, is that it did not develop a coherent theory that the movement of
resources from one place to another is costly, and that institutions are the devices
that humans create in order to effect this movement. By contrast, old
institutionalism understood the need for institutions well enough and thus was able
to study the relationship between law and economics in a way that was previously
unknown. Without marginalism as an analytic lever, however, old institutionalism
was unable to do much more than catalog and classify. The merger of marginalism
into institutionalism gave the new brand of institutionalism a much more coherent
program and voice. However, old and new institutionalism are extraordinarily
different creatures, with very different perspectives on the relationship between
economics and law.21
I. BRITISH MARGINALISM BEFORE COASE
Two characteristics of Cambridge economics proved to be lightning rods for
Coase’s thought. The first was marginalism and the second was a belief that
interpersonal comparisons of utility were a useful part of economic inquiry.
A. Marginalism, Equilibrium, and the Cost of Moving Resources
The word “marginalism,” with its conception of the rational actor and decision
making at the margin, was very likely coined by John A. Hobson shortly before
World War I to describe economics’ integration of marginal utility theory with
classical political economy.22 But marginalist analysis dated back to at least the

18. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coasean Markets, 31 EUR. J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming
2011) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Coasean Markets] (published online Dec. 8, 2010, available
at http://www.springerlink.com/content/65031035h363g164/fulltext.pdf).
19. See William Dugger, The New Institutionalism: New but Not Institutionalist, 24 J.
ECON. ISSUES 423 (1990) (criticizing New Institutionalism for rejecting earlier commitments
to behaviorism, cognition, and the study of nonmarket transfers of resources).
20. In 2009 Oliver E. Williamson, NIE’s most prominent spokesperson other than
Coase himself, received the Nobel Prize. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences
in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Oct. 24, 2010),
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009.
21. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, and Transaction Cost Economics in
Antitrust Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613 (2010).
22. See JOHN A. HOBSON, THE INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM 114 (1909) (discussing marginal
units and productivity); JOHN A. HOBSON, WORK AND WEALTH 174–75, 331 (1909).
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1870s.23 By the early twentieth century, marginalist thought had overrun economics
in Britain, the United States, and much of the Continent.24
Marginal utility theory revolutionized economics in a number of ways. First, it
was forward looking. For the marginalists, value became a function of willingness
to pay for the next unit, rather than an average of previous values or some theory
about how much labor went into producing something, as it had been for the
classical political economists.25 Marginalism’s rational actor received decreasing
marginal value from goods and maximized his position by exchange until the
marginal value of each was the same, or in “equilibrium.” In The Nature of the
Firm, Coase simply applied this principle to the business firm rather than the
individual as an economic actor.26
The early marginalists, particularly Alfred Marshall, were infatuated with
mechanics, and with the ways that higher mathematics could be applied to
questions about how physical materials tend to move toward a steady state in which
all the forces acting on them are equalized.27 As in the theory of mechanics,
marginalism introduced mathematics into economics in a way previously unknown
in British economics, except for a few acknowledgements of the work of Augustin
Cournot.28
At the same time, marginalism threatened to deprive economics of much of its
historical, biological, and empirical content. Its leading thinkers were heavily
preoccupied with developing the mathematical and geometric techniques of their
discipline, and their principal focus was market behavior.29 Marginalism was quite
unconcerned with how people actually experienced needs and wants, or what the
inherited or environmental sources of wants might be. It simply presumed that its
actors were rational, which meant that they had a set of transitive preferences30 over

23. See RICHARD S. HOWEY, THE RISE OF THE MARGINAL UTILITY SCHOOL: 1870–1889,
at 1–24 (1960) (discussing the origins of marginalist neoclassical economics in the work of
William Stanley Jevons in the late 1860s and 1870s).
24. See generally id. (tracing rise of marginalist thought in England, Continental
Europe, and the United States). See also EMIL KAUDER, THE HISTORY OF MARGINAL UTILITY
THEORY (1965) (focusing on the underpinnings and development of marginalist thought);
Richard S. Howey, The Origins of Marginalism, 4 HIST. POL. ECON. 281 (1972); George J.
Stigler, The Development of Utility Theory. II, 58 J. POL. ECON. 373 (1950).
25. The most prominent classical political economists were Adam Smith, David
Ricardo, James Mill and his son John Stuart Mill, Thomas Malthus, and Jean-Baptiste Say.
See BLAUG, supra note 10, at 33–214. On the divide between pre-marginalist and marginalist
economics in United States policy, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW: 1836–1937, at 193–98 (1991) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE].
26. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937) [hereinafter
Coase, Nature of the Firm].
27. See Neil Hart, Marshall’s Dilemma: Equilibrium Versus Evolution, 37 J. ECON.
ISSUES 1139, 1139–40 (2003) (discussing tension between evolutionary and engineering
models in Marshall’s thought).
28. See, e.g., 1 ALFRED MARSHALL, THE EARLY WRITINGS OF ALFRED MARSHALL,
1867–1890, at 38–39 (1975). On Jevons’s and Marshall’s indebtedness to Cournot, see
HOWEY, supra note 23, at 80–85.
29. See BLAUG, supra note 10, at 277–353.
30. Preference transitivity, a condition of rationality, is a logical consistency condition
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goods that could be freely exchanged. When thinking of firms, the marginalists did
the same thing that they did for persons; that is, they were very attentive to the
mathematics of competition and monopoly, but paid little attention to the firm’s
internal operations or decision making. The best examplar of the tradition is Alfred
Marshall’s great Principles of Economics, first published in 1890.31 The
Marshallian business firm is largely a black box, consisting of cost functions and
responding to demand functions.32 As Coase himself observed many years later, the
firm in neoclassical economics was largely an abstraction that made its presence
known on the market as purchaser and seller, but whose internal workings were
largely a mystery.33 In general, neoclassical price theory assumed a frictionless
system in which firms were rational maximizers constrained by competition.34
Marginalist economics was heavily preoccupied with “equilibrium,” or the place
where resources ended up as people, firms, and markets reflected the assertion of
individual preferences.35 Prior to Pigou, however, the marginalists largely ignored
the cost of moving resources from one place to another. They assumed that
individuals and firms arranged their own preferences and also that markets
reflected interpersonal trading. But in doing so, the marginalists presupposed that
all economic actors shift resources from one use to another without any frictions in
the system.36 This lack of attention to the “costs of movement,” as Pigou called it,37
exacerbated the high level of abstraction in neoclassical economic reasoning.

that if someone prefers A over B and B over C, then she must also prefer A over C.
31. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890).
32. See Lionel Robbins, The Representative Firm, 38 ECON. J. 387, 389 (1928) (noting
highly abstract nature of business firm in Marshall’s Principles); cf. George J. Stigler, The
Place of Marshall’s Principles in the Development of Economics, in CENTENARY ESSAYS ON
ALFRED MARSHALL 8 (John K. Whitaker ed., 1990) (noting that study of the firm in price
theory is largely intended to ascertain its behavior as a demander of inputs and a supplier of
outputs); Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 743 (2005) (similar).
33. See Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV.
713, 714 (1992); cf. Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of
the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375, 377 (1983) (“The chief mission of neoclassical economics
[i.e., price theory] is to understand how the price system coordinates the use of resources, not
to understand the inner workings of real firms.”); Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm
Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141, 143 (1988) (noting extent to which the firm in
neoclassical economics is an abstraction).
34. See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 3–5 (1921) (noting
neoclassical economics’ highly abstract assumptions); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF
COMPETITIVE PRICE 24 (1942) (same).
35. See BLAUG, supra note 10, at 388–92.
36. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 5
(1981).
[T]his neoclassical formulation appears to beg all of the interesting questions.
The world with which it is concerned is a frictionless one in which institutions
do not exist and all change occurs through perfectly operating markets. In short,
the costs of acquiring information, uncertainty, and transactions costs do not
exist.
Id.
37. See PIGOU, supra note 4, pt. II, ch. III, § 3, at 138.
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Marshall himself was aware of the problem of abstraction in his Principles. In
1919, late in life, he published a much less theoretical and more descriptive study
of business firms entitled Industry and Trade.38 Marshall’s principal argument was
that as the geographic range of trade expands producers are in a better position to
take advantage of economies of scale and scope, and thus plants and firms grew
larger. This in turn shifted industries toward increased use of mass production.
Marshall’s book contains detailed, descriptive discussions of the operations of
firms in many markets, focusing heavily on products that had been the subject of
fairly recent technological advances, such as steel and textiles.39
Marshall did not develop a theory of business firm structure based on the cost of
moving resources, or transaction costs. However, this passage from Industry and
Trade suggests at least a minimal perception that transaction costs as well as
production costs played a role in determining the vertical structure of the firm:
The advantages, which a business derives from vertical expansion, are
chiefly in regard to the organization of its work, and to the economies
of marketing. As a rule it obtains few additional economies on the
technical side of production: for there results little or no increase in the
resources of plant and skill which it commands for any particular task.
But it can so adjust the output of its lower stages to the requirements for
material of the upper stages, that scarcely anything needs to be bought
except for the lowest stage; and scarcely anything needs to be marketed
except from the highest stages: while in the special case of a steel
business, as has already been observed, it is often possible to shift
temporarily some labour and some plant from work for one stage to
work for another. In any case the higher stages can rely on the quality
of the material supplied from the lower, and on its adaptability to their
wants; especially if “planning” and “routing” are organized
scientifically.40
In The Nature of the Firm (1937), Coase spoke mainly of “marketing” costs
rather than transaction costs.41 The Marshall passage also anticipated the view
developed later in transaction-cost economics that transactional rather than

38. ALFRED MARSHALL, INDUSTRY AND TRADE: A STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNIQUE
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION; AND OF THEIR INFLUENCES ON THE CONDITIONS OF VARIOUS
CLASSES AND NATIONS (3d ed. 1919) [hereinafter MARSHALL, INDUSTRY AND TRADE]; see
also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm, 1880–
1960, 95 IOWA L. REV. 863, 871–72 (2010) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Law of Vertical
Integration], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1268328
(discussing Marshall’s Industry and Trade as an early theory of vertical integration).
39. See, e.g., MARSHALL, INDUSTRY AND TRADE, supra note 38, at 56–59, 799–802
(discussing textile production and markets); id. at 94–95, 218–21, 802–03 (discussing steel
production and markets).
40. Id. at 589.
41. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 26, at 392 (“[T]he operation of a market
costs something and by forming an organization and allowing some authority (an
‘entrepreneur’) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved.”); see also id. at
395 (“[A] point must be reached where the loss through the waste of resources is equal to the
marketing costs of the exchange transaction in the open market . . . .”).
AND
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technological constraints determine when a firm produces internally and when it
procures from an external source.42
However, Marshall clearly did not share Coase’s idea of the firm. In another
passage of Industry and Trade he opined that there was a tendency on the part of
business firms to grow larger than was economically justified. He blamed this
tendency on the aggrandizement of directors, suggesting that it showed up “in the
tendency of some joint stock companies and municipalities to make things, which it
would perhaps have been better for themselves and for others that they should have
bought.”43 Marshall added that the “owner of a business, when contemplating any
change, is led by his own interest to weigh the whole gain that it would probably
bring to the business, against the whole loss.”44 But he concluded that the “private
interest of the salaried manager, or official, often draws him in another direction.”45
These observations presaged not only Coase’s marginalist theory of firm structure,
but also the idea of separation of ownership and control that became a staple of
institutionalism’s economic critique of the business corporation in the 1930s.46 But
neoclassical economics largely ignored Marshall’s observations and developed a
theory of the firm that praised rather than lamented the separation of ownership and
control, seeing the firm as an engine for the maximization of its own value quite
apart from the separate wishes of stockholders.47
While the costs of moving resources from one place to another were not
explicitly identified in Marshall’s model of markets, he was clearly aware of them.
Indeed, Industry and Trade was obsessed with the notion that firms continuously
seek to reduce their own costs. Marshall admired and often referred to “Taylorism,”
or scientific efficiency analysis.48 Frederick Winslow Taylor was an American
engineer who developed a theory of scientific management that emphasized the
streamlining of steps in workflow in order to reduce costs.49 The Marshallian firm
economized by taking advantage of the best technology and limiting the number of
costly steps in the production process.
Arthur Cecil Pigou, who succeeded Marshall as professor of political economy
at Cambridge in 1908,50 developed a much more comprehensive theory about the

42. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION 82–117
(1975).
43. MARSHALL, INDUSTRY AND TRADE, supra note 38, at 322.
44. Id. at 324.
45. Id.
46. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
47. On this point, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Neoclassicism and the Separation of
Ownership and Control, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 373, 375 (2009); see also Thomas K.
McCraw, In Retrospect: Berle and Means, 18 REV. AM. HIST. 578 (1990).
48. MARSHALL, INDUSTRY AND TRADE, supra note 38, at 368, 375–77, 385–87.
49. See FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911);
see also MARSHALL, INDUSTRY AND TRADE, supra note 38, at 368; Neil B. Niman, Charles
Babbage’s Influence on the Development of Alfred Marshall’s Theory of the Firm, 30 J.
HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 479 (2008).
50. On Pigou’s appointment, see RONALD H. COASE, The Appointment of Pigou as
Marshall’s Successor, in RONALD H. COASE, ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 151,
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costs of moving resources from places of lesser value to places of greater value.
Pigou was also quite clear that the costs of bargaining were included among these
costs of movement. As he wrote in The Economics of Welfare:
Suppose that between two points A and B the movement of a unit of
resources can be effected at a capital cost equivalent to an annual
charge of n shillings for every year during which a unit that is moved
continues in productive work in its new home. In these circumstances
the national dividend will be increased by the movement of resources
from A to B, so long as the annual value of the marginal social net
product at B exceeds that at A by more than n shillings; and it will be
injured by any movement of resources which occurs after the excess of
the value of the marginal social net product at B has been reduced
below n shillings.51
From this observation Pigou derived this rule:
[W]hen the costs of movement between A and B are equivalent to n
shillings, the national dividend is best served by the maintenance of the
existing distribution, whatever that may be, provided that this
distribution does not involve a divergence in the values of marginal
social net products greater than n shillings; and, if the existing
distribution does involve a divergence greater than n shillings, by a new
distribution brought about by the transference of sufficient resources to
bring the divergence down to n shillings.52
For Pigou, the cost of moving resources included bargaining costs, but was not
limited to them. Rather, these costs included:
[P]ayments that have to be made to various agents in the capital market,
promoters, financing syndicates, investment trusts, solicitors, bankers,
and others, who, in varying degrees according to the nature of the
investment concerned, help in the work of transporting capital from its
places of origin to its places of employment.53
Like the other early Cambridge economists, Pigou believed that the sovereign
could increase welfare by transferring resources among classes, provided that the
recipient groups experienced greater welfare than the expropriated groups gave up,
and that the cost of movement was less than the difference. That is, Pigou believed
151–66 (1994).
51. PIGOU, supra note 4, pt. II, ch. III, § 3, at 138; see Hovenkamp, Coase Theorem,
supra note 4 (comparing Pigou’s broader conception of cost of movement against Coase’s
conception of transaction costs).
52. PIGOU, supra note 4, pt. II, ch. III, § 3, at 138–39.
53. Id. pt. II, ch. VII, § 1, at 158. Guido Calabresi, the other person that Richard Posner
cites as a founder of modern law and economics in the United States, also used “cost” much
more broadly in this fashion. See Calabresi, supra note 1 (speaking not of transaction costs,
but rather of such costs as those of running the insurance system, costs of administering the
system of enterprise liability, and the like). For Posner’s comment crediting Calabresi, see
supra note 1.
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that at least to some extent the economic policy maker could engage in
interpersonal comparisons of utility.
B. The Ordinalist Revolution
At least as subsequent critics characterized it, the second important element of
Cambridge economics was its belief that utility functions could be expressed in
cardinal units that could be compared across persons.54 Each individual maximized
personal utility by prioritizing desire and expenditure. But the Cambridge
economists agreed that, at least at a general level, it was possible to compare
utilities across people or classes of people—for example, by saying that the transfer
of wealth from the wealthy to the poor increased social welfare because a poor
person valued an incremental (marginal) dollar by a greater amount than the
wealthy person suffered from its loss.
This view was rarely expressed as categorically as Robbins later implied in his
Essay.55 Even early British marginalists, such as William Stanley Jevons and F.Y.
Edgeworth, expressed some doubt about the domain of utility measurement. Jevons
believed that comparison of subjective mental states was impossible, but that
welfare comparisons across social classes based on externally observable criteria
might be feasible.56 In his Mathematical Psychics, Edgeworth suggested that a
device called a “hedonimeter” might someday be developed that could measure
individual utilities and even compare the utility of one person with that of
another.57 Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, writing in the 1890s, argued that the
satisfaction of desires comes in two kinds. One refers to the satisfaction of
subjective preferences, “whether legitimate or not.”58 Pareto gave the term

54. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong About
Welfare Economics?, 22 J. ECON. LIT. 507, 515–16 (1984).
55. LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE & SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE
137 (2d ed. 1935) (“It is safe to say that the great majority of English economists accept them
as axiomatic.”).
56. See WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Penguin
Books 1970) (1871). In the introduction, Jevons stated:
The reader will find, again, that there is never, in any single instance, an
attempt to compare the amount of feeling in one mind with that in another. I see
no means by which such comparison can be accomplished. The susceptibility of
one mind may, for what we know, be a thousand times greater than that of
another. But, provided that the susceptibility was different in a like ratio in all
directions, we should never be able to discover the difference. Every mind is
thus inscrutable to every other mind, and no common denominator of feeling
seems to be possible. . . . [T]he motive in one mind is weighed only against
other motives in the same mind, never against the motives in other minds.
Id. at 85; see also HARRO MAAS, WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
ECONOMICS (2005); SANDRA PEART, THE ECONOMICS OF W.S. JEVONS 124–40 (1996)
(discussing Jevons’s work on political economy in detail).
57. See F.Y. EDGEWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION
OF MATHEMATICS TO THE MORAL SCIENCES 101–02 (A.M. Kelley Publishing 1967) (1881).
58. Cooter & Rappoport, supra note 54, at 515 (quoting VILFREDO PARETO, COURS
D’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE 3 (1896)).
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“ophelimity” to these purely subjective preferences.59 He reserved the term “utility”
to describe the second kind of desires—those which are “conducive to the
development and prosperity of an individual, a people, or the human race.”60 In
sum, for these early marginalists, utility had not only a subjective meaning, but also
an objective meaning that was related to observed productivity. By and large they
doubted their ability to make interpersonal comparisons of subjective preference,
but had greater confidence about interpersonal comparisons of these objective
criteria of welfare.61
Both Marshall and Pigou believed that human utility functions were more-orless similar across persons, and so it followed that interpersonal comparisons of
cardinal utilities were at least roughly possible. As a result, both Marshall and
Pigou could believe that classwide involuntary wealth transfers from the wealthy
members of society to poorer members increased total welfare. Having less to start
with, poorer individuals experienced higher marginal utility from an increment of
money than did the wealthy. For example, Marshall wrote in 1885 that social
change could beneficially “tak[e] account of the fact that the same sum of money
measures a greater pleasure for the poor than for the rich.”62
Pigou also believed that wealth transfers from wealthy to poor typically took
luxuries away from the wealthy in order to provide necessities to the poor:
[I]t is evident that any transference of income from a relatively rich
man to a relatively poor man of similar temperament, since it enables
more intense wants to be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants,
must increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction. The old “law of
diminishing utility” thus leads securely to the proposition: Any cause
which increases the absolute share of real income in the hands of the
poor, provided that it does not lead to a contraction in the size of the
national dividend from any point of view, will, in general, increase
economic welfare.63
Pigou’s position was in fact quite measured. More than Marshall, Pigou wanted
to preserve the status of economics as a tool for policy. He realized that doing so
forced economics to confront moral issues and perhaps even step over “the narrow
boundaries of . . . science” and into ethics.64 Whatever one might think of the
ordinalist critique of interpersonal utility comparisons, Pigou wrote in the early
1950s, “[i]n all practical affairs we act on” the supposition that such comparisons

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law and Economics Movement, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 993, 1053 (1990).
62. Alfred Marshall, The Present Position of Economics, Inaugural Lecture at
Cambridge University (Feb. 24, 1885), in 1 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 121, 131 (2005); see
also ARTHUR C. PIGOU, MEMORIALS OF ALFRED MARSHALL (1925).
63. PIGOU, supra note 4, pt. I, ch. VIII, § 3, at 89.
64. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, ECONOMICS IN PRACTICE: SIX LECTURES ON CURRENT ISSUES
107 (1935). On Pigou, see JOHN SALTMARSH & PATRICK WILKINSON, ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU,
1877–1959 (1960).
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are meaningful, and that without them the entire “apparatus of practical thought,”
would be ruined.65
Further, Pigou believed that his arguments for wealth transfers from the wealthy
to the poor did not rest on any notions about utility at the margin, but rather on the
potential for creating objectively measurable improvements. Such transfers to the
poor “make possible the development in them, through education and otherwise, of
capacities and faculties adapted for the enjoyment of the enlarged income.”66 This
idea created a decisive line between the neoclassicists and the institutionalists. For
Robbins, human welfare was measured purely as a consumption function, with
utility as its currency. For Darwinians and the emergent social sciences, the human
welfare function came closer to resembling an economists’ production function,
which evaluates an entity by looking at its output in relation to its inputs. That is, it
tended to equate welfare with the ability to produce rather than with the
satisfactions that come from consumption.67
As noted, one important qualifier that the Cambridge economists placed on
interpersonal utility comparisons is that they were thought to be more meaningful,
or robust, when applied to groups rather than individuals. Further, this idea made
economics more relevant to policy, because government wealth transfers typically
worked among classes or identified homogeneous populations rather than
individuals. In one well-known passage of his Principles, Marshall conceded that
one would not be warranted in saying that two individuals of equal wealth derived
the same marginal utility from a fixed amount of wealth.68 However,
[i]f there are a thousand persons living in Sheffield, and another
thousand in Leeds, each with about £100 a-year, and a tax of £1 is
levied on all of them; we may be sure that the loss of pleasure or other
injury which the tax will cause in Sheffield is of about equal
importance with that which it will cause in Leeds . . . .69
Pigou likewise spoke mainly of wealth transfers among classes. “[U]nless we have
a special reason to believe the contrary, a given amount of stuff may be presumed
to yield a similar amount of satisfaction, not indeed as between any one man and
any other, but as between representative members of groups of individuals . . . .”70
For these economists, sometimes referred to as the “material welfare” school,
interpersonal comparisons of utility were possible at least at the “survival” or
“basic necessity” end of the utility range—that is, for those goods that people
needed first and could not afford to be without. However, as one proceeded along

65. Arthur C. Pigou, Some Aspects of Welfare Economics, 41 AM. ECON. REV. 287, 292
(1951).
66. PIGOU, supra note 4, pt. I, ch. VIII, § 3, at 91.
67. For a comprehensive attempt to relate human “utility functions” to Darwin and
survival, see RICHARD DAWKINS, RIVER OUT OF EDEN: A DARWINIAN VIEW OF LIFE 95–134
(1995).
68. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS bk. I, ch. ii, § 12, at 18 (8th ed.
1920).
69. Id. at 18–19.
70. Pigou, supra note 65, at 292 (emphasis in original).
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the marginal utility scale to “comforts” and “luxuries,”71 such comparisons were
much more difficult to undertake.72
Even highly mathematical pre-ordinalist economists, such as Yale’s Irving
Fisher, developed statistical concepts of the “average family” in order to measure
the marginal utility of money.73 He concluded that “mass statistical measurements”
would be more accurate than the measurement of the utility of “any individual who
feels them.”74 From this Fisher devised what he believed were average utility levels
for different economic classes, which he believed justified a progressive income
tax. Several American economists developed similar ideas.75
Fisher’s concern with statistical averages illustrates the one important weakness
that members of the material welfare school perceived about interpersonal utility
comparisons—the great difficulty of measurement. Marginalists since the time of
Jevons had been able to apply mathematics to problems of individual choice in

71. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, supra note 68, at bk. II, ch. iii, § 3, at 67–68
(“This brings us to consider the term Necessaries. It is common to distinguish necessaries,
comforts, and luxuries; the first class including all things required to meet wants
which must be satisfied, while the latter consist of things that meet wants of a less urgent
character. But here again there is a troublesome ambiguity. When we say that a want must be
satisfied, what are the consequences which we have in view if it is not satisfied? Do they
include death? Or do they extend only to the loss of strength and vigour? In other words, are
necessaries the things which are necessary for life, or those which are necessary for
efficiency?”).
72. The distinction is developed in Cooter & Rappoport, supra note 54, at 513–14.
73. Irving Fisher, A Statistical Method for Measuring “Marginal Utility” and Testing
the Justice of a Progressive Income Tax, in ECONOMIC ESSAYS CONTRIBUTED IN HONOR OF
JOHN BATES CLARK 181 (Jacob H. Hollander ed., 1927) [hereinafter Fisher, Statistical
Method]; see also IRVING FISHER, MATHEMATICAL INVESTIGATIONS IN THE THEORY OF VALUE
AND PRICES (Yale Univ. Press 1925) (1891) (developing alternative mechanisms for making
interpersonal utility comparisons).
74. Fisher, Statistical Method, supra note 73, at 159; see David Colander,
Retrospectives: Edgeworth’s Hedonimeter and the Quest to Measure Utility, 21 J. ECON.
PERSP. 215, 219–21 (2007) (discussing Fisher’s model).
75. See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 10 (1893) (“To the
poor man all the marginal increments may afford high satisfaction, because his supplies are
limited; but to the rich man the marginal increments may give little satisfaction. Yet each,
though on different levels, endeavours to make the marginal increments in all lines equal.”);
1 F.W. TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS ch. 9, § 6, at 132 (3d ed. 1921) (“The principle
of diminishing utility, if applied unflinchingly, leads to the conclusion that inequality of
incomes brings a less sum of human well-being than equality of incomes, and that the greater
the inequality, the less the approach to the maximum.”); GEORGE P. WATKINS, WELFARE AS
AN ECONOMIC QUANTITY 185–90 (1915) (arguing that total social utility would increase if
incomes were leveled somewhat and the right to inherit severely curtailed); J.B. Clark, The
Ultimate Standard of Value, 1 YALE REV. 258 (1892) (arguing that social welfare is a
function of aggregated individual utilities); Simon N. Patten, The Scope of Political
Economy, 2 YALE REV. 264 (1893) (arguing that homogeneity of wealth and property tends
to increase total utility); Jacob Viner, The Utility Concept in Value Theory and Its Critics
(pts. 1 & 2), 33 J. POL. ECON. 369, 638, 644 (1925) (“Changes in the relative distribution of
income as between different classes will bring about changes in the amount of welfare, even
though the aggregate real income of the community remains the same.”).
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technically and conceptually accurate ways. Tautologically, an individual equates
utilities at the margin—exchanging goods or time for which he has lower utility for
that which provides higher utility—until all are in equilibrium. But neoclassicism
became stuck at that point. If utilities could not be compared across persons, then
economics could say little to nothing about the optimal distribution of wealth and,
indeed, could not even justify providing food to starving children.
The Robbins critique of interpersonal utility comparisons was forceful not
simply because it pointed out the greater susceptibility of individual preferences to
mathematical reasoning. Rather, it defined interpersonal utility comparisons as
being outside the boundaries of economic science altogether. This well-known
paragraph from Robbins’ Essay on economic methodology states his conclusions:
But suppose that we differed about the satisfaction derived by A from
an income of £1,000, and the satisfaction derived by B from an income
of twice that magnitude. Asking them would provide no solution.
Supposing they differed. A might urge that he had more satisfaction
than B at the margin. While B might urge that, on the contrary, he had
more satisfaction than A. We do not need to be slavish behaviourists to
realise that here is no scientific evidence. There is no means of testing
the magnitude of A’s satisfaction as compared with B’s. If we tested the
state of their blood-streams, that would be a test of blood, not
satisfaction. Introspection does not enable A to discover what is going
on in B's mind, nor B to discover what is going on in A’s. There is no
way of comparing the satisfactions of different people.76
And speaking of comparing one person’s utilities with those of another:
It is a comparison which necessarily falls outside the scope of any
positive science. To state that A’s preference stands above B’s in order
of importance is entirely different from stating that A prefers n to m and
B prefers n and m in a different order. It involves an element of
conventional valuation. Hence it is essentially normative. It has no
place in pure science.77
As a result, Robbins concluded that any argument for greater income equality based
on the theory that the poor would derive greater marginal utility from an increment
than the wealthy would lose from an identical reduction is “entirely unwarranted by
any doctrine of scientific economics.”78 Rather, “[i]t rests upon an extension of the
Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility into a field in which it is entirely
illegitimate.”79
It is worth noting that there were and remain good alternatives to the Robbins
approach of writing all interpersonal utility comparisons out of the discipline. Most
obviously, Robbins’s critique was expressly about individual subjective mental

76. ROBBINS, supra note 55, at 139–40 (emphasis in original); see also Lionel Robbins,
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment, 48 ECON. J. 635 (1938).
77. ROBBINS, supra note 55, at 139.
78. Id. at 137.
79. Id.
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states—something that earlier marginalists had already decided was beyond
measurement. By looking for alternative, more objective criteria of welfare,
neoclassicism could have developed separate branches with their own individual
methodologies for price theory and welfare economics.80 Ten years before
Robbins’s Essay, University of Chicago economist Jacob Viner faulted marginalist
economics for purporting to measure individual subjective welfare but instead
using an objective standard for everything except voluntary exchanges. Viner
wrote, “[M]uch of what passes for utility theory is really objective price-theory
presented in the purloined terminology of subjective analysis . . . .”81 Frank Knight
criticized the “pernicious concept of utility.”82 He allowed that “[w]hen we come to
pass judgment on the workings of the price system, we have to have a theory of
utility as a starting point.”83 In Knight’s concept, a purely ordinalist notion of
declining marginal utility for the individual helped us explain the workings of
markets. However, it was useless as an explanation of social behavior or social
welfare.
More importantly, Robbins’s conclusions about the domain of economics were
just as normative as those of the Cambridge economists. The idea that making
welfare judgments outside of the limitations of subjective utility analysis was
“normative”—while strict adherence to the non-comparability of individual utilities
was somehow scientific—itself reflected a highly value-laden judgment about the
scope of scientific investigation. If one views welfare as nothing more than
subjective preference, then interpersonal comparisons cannot be observed. As a
result, they must be counted as normative under a criterion for science requiring
that conclusions be capable of being falsified. On the other hand, if one views
individual welfare as a function of productivity rather than subjective desire, then
empirical comparisons are possible. For example, we could conduct observations
that $1000 given to a poor person made noticeable differences in nutrition, housing,
education, and the like, while $1000 given to a millionaire made no measureable
difference at all. Cambridge economists such as Pigou often measured welfare in
this way, and both the institutionalists and American legal realists continued to do
so in the 1920s and after. Indeed, Joan Robinson’s later work on the production
function was based in substantial part on the premise that the value of individual
human productivity had been slighted in welfare analysis.84
Even the most virulent ordinalists reverted to objective measures when they
spoke of business firms rather than persons. Firms maximize value, which can be
cardinally measured and is directly related to productivity. The only way we can

80. On this point, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal
Policy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 4, 6–10, 22–24, 29–40 (1994).
81. Viner, supra note 75, at 657.
82. F.H. Knight, The Concept of Normal Price in Value and Distribution, 32 Q.J.
ECON. 66, 67 (1917).
83. Irving Fisher, Frank H. Knight & Carl E. Parry, Discussion, Traditional Economic
Theory, 11 AM. ECON. REV. 143, 145 (1921).
84. See Joan Robinson, The Production Function and the Theory of Capital, 21 REV.
ECON. STUD. 81 (1953); see also Joan Robinson, The Production Function, 65 ECON. J. 67,
67 (1955) (using illustration of the production function of a robin as measured by the number
of grubs caught in relation to the number of robin-minutes worked).
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speak of value is objectively. Indeed, neoclassical economics rarely considers the
states of mind of a firm’s shareholders or managers. So, for example, to observe
that a firm turned inputs that cost $1000 into output worth $1200 could be a strictly
scientific proposition; however, to attach welfare significance to the observation
that a biological person responded to a $1000 gift by buying a better house or
improving her education lays outside the boundaries of science because it was
thought to depend on unverifiable inferences about state of mind.
In sum, Robbins’s critique rested on the premise that it was “scientific” to speak
economically about human beings in terms of consumption but “normative” to
speak of them in terms of production. This constraint is itself normative, but it is
also irrational because greater productivity reduces scarcity and thus leads to
greater consumption as well. One does not need to engage in interpersonal
comparisons of utility to conclude that ceteris paribus a society that has greater
wealth will permit a greater amount of wants to be satisfied.
Robbins’s limitations were particularly stringent because his Essay did not
purport to be simply a set of constraints on the study of personal preferences.
Rather, he represented that he spoke about the entire field of economics as a
science. In a few paragraphs, he identified human welfare with consumption rather
than production and proclaimed the study of anything else as purely normative.85
As developed below, one impact of this limitation was to divorce neoclassical
economics from the theory of evolution and evolutionary psychology, the
alternative claimants to scientific status in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century. At bottom, Darwinian evolution is a theory about production—that is,
about the development of traits that enable organisms to survive in an environment
of scarce resources. This became clear with the rise of Reform Darwinism prior to
the Progressive Era.86 Metaphors typically used by the Reform Darwinists included
the farmer cultivating seed or the cattle breeder; these were interventions in nature
whose efficacy depended on measured changes in productivity, not on subjective
feelings of well being. Success in the Darwinian struggle for survival is plotted as a
production function, not a consumption function.87
Robbins’s critique of interpersonal utility comparisons also gave insufficient
weight to the enormous trade-offs that had to be given up. As Cooter and
Rappoport have concluded, any evaluation of the ordinalist critique of interpersonal
utility comparisons makes it “necessary to balance the gains in understanding
markets which the ordinalist framework facilitated against the losses in
understanding human welfare, suffered by abandoning the material welfare
framework.”88 Nevertheless, as a matter of history, one thing seems clear: after the
ordinalist revolution swept the field, economic science was all about voluntary
exchange, or markets, and markets are all about transactions.
Finally, the ordinalist critique revealed that, depending on assumptions, the
mathematics of marginalism could lead to ideological views at the two extremes

85. E.g., ROBBINS, supra note 55, at 135–37.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 96–97.
87. See LESTER F. WARD, DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY, OR APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE AS BASED
UPON STATICAL SOCIOLOGY AND THE LESS COMPLEX SCIENCES 491 (1883) (cattle); id. at 541–
42 (seed).
88. Cooter & Rappoport, supra note 54, at 528.
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but with a middle ground that was difficult to defend. Carried to its logical
conclusion, the principle of diminishing marginal utility, coupled with interpersonal
utility comparisons on an individual basis, led directly to socialism, or a state in
which wealth was equalized, for equalization produced the greatest total welfare.
Both Alfred Marshall and particularly Joan Robinson, pre-ordinalists, became near
socialists late in their lives—a fact that may have operated to deny the ageing Joan
Robinson the status of first woman to receive the Nobel Prize in Economics.89
At the other extreme, the Robbins critique saw only individual orderings of
preferences and market exchange as increasing welfare, and proclaimed that
drawing conclusions about the welfare effects of involuntary wealth transfers lay
outside the boundaries of economic science. The result of that view was extreme
laissez faire, with a government justified in intervening on welfare grounds only in
infrequent cases of market failure.90
Compromise positions were difficult to defend. The proposals of people such as
Marshall, Pigou, and Irving Fisher that interpersonal utility comparisons be based
on classes rather than individuals was a well-intentioned attempt. But it ultimately
did not fit into either paradigm particularly well. For the older marginalists, the
attempt at compromise led to equality of income between classes rather than
individuals. But once again the economic effect was pure socialism. For the
ordinalists, class comparison was no more readily susceptible to scientific study
than individual comparison. So economics was at an impasse.
While Coase never engaged in the ordinalist debate and was seriously interested
in institutions, he was also completely ordinalist in his thinking. As a result, for him
the concern of economics was properly limited to three things: (1) market exchange
and the costs of the exchange process; (2) price theory, which employed a currency
of constant value; and (3) the internal preferences exercised by the single economic
actor, including the business firm, making decisions under scarcity.
II. THE RISE OF INSTITUTIONALISM
A. Darwin, Behaviorism, and the Revolt Against Marginalism
The two greatest intellectual products of Victorian thought were Darwinism and
marginalism.91 While Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection was
uniquely British, marginalism evolved simultaneously in both England and the
Continent. Its principal innovators were William Stanley Jevons of England, Carl
Menger of Austria, and Leon Walras of France.92 Both Darwinism and marginalism

89. See Paul A. Samuelson, Remembering Joan, in JOAN ROBINSON: CRITICAL
ASSESSMENTS OF LEADING ECONOMISTS 35, 35–36 (Prue Kerr with G.C. Harcourt eds., 2002)
[hereinafter JOAN ROBINSON]. A woman did not receive the Nobel Prize in Economics until
2009, when it was given to Elinor Ostrom. Noble Prize Awarded Women, NOBLEPRIZE.ORG
(Oct. 25, 2010), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/lists/women.html.
90. See I.M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 54–56 (1950) (repeatedly
emphasizing this point).
91. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND.
L. REV. 305, 305–06 (1993).
92. See HOWEY, supra note 23, at 1–35.
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had effects that not only overturned their “home” disciplines but that also spilled
out into many other areas. During the final decades of the nineteenth century and
the first two decades of the twentieth, Darwinism and marginalism seemed
independently to paint a fairly complete picture of human welfare and social
obligation. Marginalism provided a rigorous theory of individual incentives and
valuation. Darwinism offered both a principle of physical development and also a
theory of society and culture, as well as prescriptions about welfare and the role of
the state.93
One characteristic of Darwinism was the link it saw between instinct and
survival, and the fact that within a species basic survival needs were nearly
identical. In any given environment, the organisms that tended to survive had a
common set of characteristics and needs. These largely biological observations led
people in diverse ideological directions, at least as caricatured in later writing by
intellectual historians.94 For so-called “Social Darwinists,” the fittest organisms
will survive and state interference to support them artificially will degrade the race
or retard its evolution.95 At the other extreme, the “Reform Darwinists” believed
that both the environment and the individual could and should be manipulated in
order to make individuals better able to survive and prosper.96 For the Reform
Darwinists, as well as most of the emergent generation of social scientists,
Darwinian thought provided a basis for thinking that by altering the environment,

93. On Alfred Marshall and Darwin, see Geoffrey Fishburn, Natura Non Facit Saltum
in Alfred Marshall (and Charles Darwin), 40 HIST. ECON. REV. 59, 59 (2004) (“Nature does
not make a leap.”); Neil Hart, Marshall’s Dilemma: Equilibrium versus Evolution, 37 J.
ECON. ISSUES 1139 (2003). On uses of Darwin by early American economists, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models]; Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics
Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993 (1990). More generally, see THE FOUNDATIONS OF
EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS, 1890–1973 (Geoffrey M. Hodgson ed., 1998).
94. E.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 67–170
(rev. ed. 1959) (1944) (writing as reform critics of Social Darwinism); see also Donald C.
Bellomy, “Social Darwinism” Revisited, in 1 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1
(Bernard Bailyn, Donald Fleming & Stephan Thernstrom eds., 1984) (noting how Social
Darwinism has been caricatured); Thomas C. Leonard, Origins of the Myth of Social
Darwinism: The Ambiguous Legacy of Richard Hofstadter’s Social Darwinism in American
Thought, 71 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 37 (2009).
95. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 94, at 6–7.
96. See DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 156–62 (1991).
Ross uses the term “liberal exceptionalism” rather than “Reform Darwinism.” Importantly,
Reform Darwinism, by whatever name it is called, also led to eugenics and the use of
controlled breeding or sterilization to improve the human race, along with exclusion of
certain immigrants and other racist policies that quickly became classified as horrific after
the rise of Adolf Hitler. See CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE
AND REVIVAL OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 45–48 (1991); MARK H.
HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1984). On the
economics, see Claudia Goldin, The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the
United States, 1890 to 1921, in THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO
POLITICAL ECONOMY 223 (Claudia Goldin and Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994); Thomas C.
Leonard, Retrospectives: Eugenics and Economics in the Progressive Era, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 207 (2005).
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or giving its members better survival tools, they could increase their chances of
success. Darwinism thus permitted liberal policy makers to generalize about
individual “welfare” needs without making assumptions about individual mental
states. As a result, the ordinalist economic critique of interpersonal utility
comparisons was irrelevant to them.97
Among the literate laity, Darwinism was much better known than marginalism
but also more infamous. Marginalism never produced any equivalent to Richard
Hofstadter’s extremely influential book entitled Social Darwinism in American
Thought,98 as well as an entire generation of historians who explained intellectual
history largely in Darwinian terms.99 Darwinism was better known because, at a
fairly general level, one could explain the theory of natural selection without the
use of technical apparatus such as mathematics. Darwinism was also more
infamous, however, because the “natural selection” that motivated Darwinism was
more threatening to Christianity than the “hedonism” that permeated the
marginalist’s subjective value system. Orthodox pastors and priests never railed at
marginalism the way they did at Darwinism. As a result, epithets such as “Social
Darwinism” were used in public discourse to describe essentially economic
thinking that was in fact more properly attributable to neoclassical economics and
marginalism than to the theory of evolution by natural selection.100
Robert Cooter and Peter Rappoport’s provocative article on the ordinalist
revolution compares the “material welfare” school, which believed that limited
interpersonal utility comparisons were possible, with the ordinalists, who soundly
rejected their views and virtually wrote such comparisons out of the boundaries of
economic science. However, Cooter and Rappoport never mention Darwin or the
theory of evolution.101 Nevertheless, built into Darwinism was a very powerful

97. See generally ROBERT C. BANNISTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM: SCIENCE AND MYTH IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1979); ERIC F. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH
DESTINY: A HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN REFORM (1952). For a comparison of American
and European views, see MIKE HAWKINS, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
THOUGHT, 1860–1945: NATURE AS MODEL AND NATURE AS THREAT (1997).
98. HOFSTADTER, supra note 94.
99. See id.; see also BANNISTER, supra note 97; PAUL F. BOLLER, JR., AMERICAN
THOUGHT IN TRANSITION: THE IMPACT OF EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM, 1865–1900 (1969);
HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN
THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880’S (1950); CYNTHIA EAGLE RUSSETT, DARWIN IN
AMERICA: THE INTELLECTUAL RESPONSE, 1865–1912 (1976). See generally MORTON WHITE,
SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (Beacon Press 1957)
(1949).
100. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40
STAN. L. REV. 379, 417–20 (1988) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Political Economy]; see also
Gregory Claeys, The “Survival of the Fittest” and the Origins of Social Darwinism, 61 J.
HIST. IDEAS 223, 223–24 (2000). Reform Darwinist Lester Frank Ward made plain his belief
that so-called Social Darwinism was not a biological doctrine at all, but rather emanated
from classical political economy. See Lester F. Ward, Social and Biological Struggles, 13
AM. J. SOC. 289, 292 (1907).
101. See Cooter & Rappoport, supra note 54. The only allusion to the theory of
evolution occurs in a footnote discussing Pareto that refers to his conception of material
welfare as “some Spencerian ideas of evolutionary fitness.” Id. at 516 n.22.
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theory of “preference” that is quite different from the radically individualistic and
subjective “preference” that is the topic of marginalist economics. This Darwinism
strongly affected many of the first generation of economists that we today describe
as institutionalists, although in different ways.102
For marginalists in the neoclassical tradition, preferences were considered as
naked, which means that they were simply recognized as asserted with little or no
thought about their derivation. Willingness to pay is what it is, and querying why
someone prefers this or that is simply outside the boundaries of economic science.
For Robbins, whose thought revolutionized the discipline, the concept of scarcity
meant little more than the fact that a person cannot have all that she desires of
everything, so choices and rankings are essential. As a result, the combination of
scarcity and preference give rise to the concept of declining marginal utility. An
individual maximizes total utility by acquiring a blend of everything she values
until, at the margin, she values everything that she has by the same amount. For
Robbins, this required only that an individual have a set of choices,103 that this set
be rational (i.e., transitive),104 and that no one can have absolutely all they might
want of everything.105
In sharp contrast, Darwinism’s starting point for analysis was the environment
rather than the individual. Ironically, Robbins’s scarcity definition of economics
that became so influential in the development of the new welfare economics106 had
in fact been a staple of Darwinian thought for decades.107 Indeed, pre-Darwinians,
such as the classical political economist Thomas Malthus, had incorporated it into

102. See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Darwinism and Institutional Economics, 37 J. ECON.
ISSUES 85, 91–95 (2003).
103. ROBBINS, supra note 55, at 78–79 (“The main postulate of the theory of value is the
fact that individuals can arrange their preferences in an order, and in fact do so.”).
104. See id. at 91–92 (“[I]n a state of equilibrium the relative significance of divisible
commodities is equal to their price does involve the assumption that each final choice is
consistent with every other, in the sense that if I prefer A to B and B to C, I also prefer A to
C . . . .”).
105. See Robbins’s famous definition of economics: “Economics is the science which
studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have
alternative uses.” Id. at 16.
106. Id.; see Marcelo Resende & Rodrigo M. Zeidan, Lionel Robbins: A Methodological
Reappraisal
(CESifo,
Working
Paper
No.
2165,
2007),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1077055; see also Roger E. Backhouse
& Steve G. Medema, Defining Economics: The Long Road to Acceptance of the Robbins
Definition, 76 ECONOMICA 805 (2009); D. Wade Hands, Effective Tension in Robbins’
Economic Methodology, 76 ECONOMICA 831 (2009); Susan Howson, The Origins of Lionel
Robbins’s Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 36 HIST. POL. ECON.
413 (2004); Roger E. Backhouse & Steve G. Medema, Defining Economics: Robbins’s
Essay in Theory and Practice (Mar. 11, 2007) (unpublished article), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=969994.
107. On the connection, see J. Hirshleifer, Competition, Cooperation, and Conflict in
Economics and Biology, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 238, 241 (1978); Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary
Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies, 4 RES. L. & ECON. 1
(1982).
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his theory of population, and Darwin, who was strongly influenced by Malthus,
built the theory of natural selection on the principle of scarcity.108
The most important difference between Darwinian choice under scarcity and
Robbins’s definition had to do with the role of natural selection, which in turn
controlled the degree of individual autonomy that accounts for the choice
mechanism.109 For Robbins’s definition, the individual was absolutely autonomous
in the sense that one cannot scientifically get behind the choices; they simply are
what they are and economic science deals with the way individuals can (positive)
and should (normative) act so as to maximize their satisfactions.
For Darwinians, in very sharp contrast, choice is a fundamental part of one’s
survival mechanism. This view of preference has powerful implications for theories
of both individual and social choice. First, under the Darwinian view, individuals
do not “control” their choices, certainly not in the broad unconstrained sense that
neoclassical economics has come to adopt. Second, Darwinian natural selection
entails that over a wide range the choices individuals make—and certainly
individuals in the same species and environment—are identical or at least closely
similar. Behaviorism increasingly came to see choices as “conditioned,” or as a
consequence of repeated iterations of some motion or response that produced either
pleasure or pain. Third, the Darwinian perspective dictates an externally imposed
preference ordering: namely, survival first and “surplus” later. For many organisms
in nature, there is no surplus and survival dictates virtually every choice that is
made. For human beings in modern society, the story is more complex. Some still
have very little surplus while others have a great deal. But the all-important fact for
Darwinism, although not stated in this terminology, was that in the survival range
organisms have preference orderings that are closely similar and that could be
treated as identical for policy purposes. Indeed, even the conditions that Robbins
imposed on choice as inherent to rationality—namely, equation of preferences at
the margin and transitivity—are “survival” traits, in the sense that organisms that
do not tend to their needs in an economical way lose out in the evolutionary
struggle.
Darwinian social theorists had made these observations throughout the last half
of the nineteenth century, and they formed the basis for the sharp divide between

108. See T.R. MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (Cambridge
University Press 1992) (1798). On the extent of Darwin’s borrowings from Malthus, as well
as other political economists, and the extent to which later economists relied on Darwin, see
Armen A. Alchian, Biological Analogies in the Theory of the Firm: Comment, 43 AM. ECON.
REV. 600 (1953) (responding to Edith Tilton Penrose, Biological Analogies in the Theory of
the Firm, 42 AM. ECON. REV. 804 (1952)); Sandra Herbert, Research Note, Darwin, Malthus
and Selection, 4 J. HIST. BIOLOGY 209 (1971); Peter Vorzimmer, Darwin, Malthus, and the
Theory of Natural Selection, 30 J. HIST. IDEAS 527 (1969); Alain Marciano, Economists on
Darwin’s Theory of Social Evolution and Human Behaviour (Max Planck Inst. of Econ.,
Papers on Economics and Evolution No. 0521, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=673061; see also Scott Gordon, Darwin and Political Economy: The
Connection Reconsidered, 22 J. HIST. BIOLOGY 437 (1989).
109. See Luigino Bruni & Robert Sugden, The Road Not Taken: How Psychology Was
Removed from Economics, and How It Might Be Brought Back, 117 ECON. J. 146 (2007).
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so-called “Social” and “Reform” Darwinists.110 Social Darwinists believed that the
struggle for survival and the emergence of “superior” characteristics were the keys
to human progress. As a result, the best policy that the State could pursue was to
leave the struggling to themselves, without aid, letting nature determine who was
fit to survive.
By contrast, Reform Darwinists, the forerunners of American Progressivism,
began by contrasting the fate of the organism in nature with the organism under
domestication. They observed that human beings are unique among organisms in
that they are aware of the fact that they are evolving and in a position to control the
process.111 For example, only human beings are involved in domestication, or the
raising, breeding, and improvement of other organisms by management of the
environment—a process that need be no more complicated than farming or cattle
breeding.112
Most important for present purposes was the Reform Darwinists’ attitude toward
scarcity. Social Darwinists such as Herbert Spencer tended to see the resources
produced by nature as fixed, and an excess of organisms including human beings as
competing for them.113 In contrast, Reform Darwinists emphasized humankind’s
ability to increase the amount of resources by vast amounts, perhaps even turning
shortages into surplus. For example, Lester Ward, who was virtually deified by
some liberal historians in the 1950s,114 argued that Social Darwinism saw “all the
functions of society” as “performed in a sort of random, chance manner, which is
precisely the reverse of economical, but wholly analogous to the natural processes
of the lower organic world.”115 Ward contrasted the wasteful “biological economy”
of nature with the “psychological economy” of “rational man.”116 The rise of
agriculture was a clear example. Nature sows by leaving seed “to the wind, the

110. See Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models, supra note 93, at 655–56.
111. The idea of self-awareness of evolution very likely originated with Auguste Comte.
See 1 HARRIET MARTINEAU, THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE 292 (2d ed.
1875) (translating and condensing AUGUSTE COMTE, COURS DE PHILOSOPHIE POSITIVE 1830–
1842).
112. The leading exemplars of Reform Darwinism in the United States are EDWARD
ALSWORTH ROSS, SOCIAL CONTROL: A SURVEY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF ORDER (Case W.
Reserve Univ. 1969) (1901); LESTER FRANK WARD, DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY (Johnson Reprint
Corp. 1968) (1883) [hereinafter WARD, DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY]; LESTER F. WARD, GLIMPSES
OF THE COSMOS (1913) [hereinafter WARD, GLIMPSES OF THE COSMOS]. On Reform
Darwinism, see L.L. BERNARD & JESSIE BERNARD, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY: THE
SOCIAL SCIENCE MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1943); JOHN C. BURNHAM, LESTER
FRANK WARD IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1956); ROBERT E.L. FARIS, CHICAGO SOCIOLOGY,
1920–1932 (Morris Janowitz ed., 1967); HOFSTADTER, supra note 94, at 64–84; JULIUS
WEINBERG, EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF PROGRESSIVISM (1972). For
further development, see Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models, supra note 93, at 654–61, 671–
83.
113. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 94, at 38–44 (discussing Spencer’s beliefs).
114. See, e.g., COMMAGER, supra note 99, at 199–226; DAVID W. NOBLE, THE PARADOX
OF PROGRESSIVE THOUGHT (1958).
115. 3 WARD, GLIMPSES OF THE COSMOS, supra note 112, at 35; see also 1 WARD,
DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY, supra note 112, at 542.
116. 4 WARD, GLIMPSES OF THE COSMOS, supra note 112, at 354.
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water, the birds and animals.”117 In contrast, the human farmer “prepares the
ground, clearing it of vegetable competitors, then . . . carefully plants the seeds at
the proper intervals . . . and after they have sprouted . . . keeps off their enemies,
. . . supplies water if needed, and even supplies the lacking chemical constituents of
the soil . . . .”118 Institutionalist economist John R. Commons echoed this theme as
well, contrasting the “natural selection” of Darwinian nature with human
“artificial” selection, which involves “intention, and belongs to human reason.”119
Reform Darwinism was the guiding principle of the early pioneers of the
modern social science movement.120 The result of their thinking was behaviorism—
a methodology that ordinalists such as Robbins flatly rejected.121 Of course, every
methodology must draw inferences from what is observed. As Robbins conceded,
economists cannot observe “valuation” because it is entirely “a subjective
process.”122 However, we can observe willingness to pay as measured by actual
transactions or bids. Behavioral social science could not observe valuation either,
but it could observe other external manifestations of welfare, such as physical
health, productivity, education, savings, and the like. As Reform Darwinists such as
Ward observed, human managers relied on external, or objective, indicia of welfare
in their domestication of lower organisms from plants to cattle.
B. Institutionalist Economics from Veblen to the Legal Realists
Mark Blaug sums up institutionalism in a single sentence, as an attempt “to
persuade economists to base their theories, not on analogies from mechanics, but
on analogies from biology and jurisprudence.”123 Institutionalism as a recognized
movement began during World War I when a group of economists, led by John

117. Id. at 355.
118. Id.
119. JOHN R. COMMONS, Natural Selection, Social Selection, and Heredity, 18 ARENA
90, 90 (1897), reprinted in 1 JOHN R. COMMONS: SELECTED ESSAYS 43, 43–49 (Malcolm
Rutherford & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1996). See generally R.A. Gonce, John R. Commons’s
Legal Economic Theory, 5 J. ECON. ISSUES 80, 88 (1971) (discussing Commons’s attempt to
integrate a theory of artificial selection into economics); Yngve Ramstad, On the Nature of
Economic Evolution: John R. Commons and the Metaphor of Artificial Selection, in
EVOLUTIONARY AND NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN APPROACHES TO ECONOMICS 65 (Lars Magnusson
ed., 1994) (same).
120. See BERNARD & BERNARD, supra note 112, at 611–69 (discussing the rise of social
science in American colleges); HAMILTON CRAVENS, THE TRIUMPH OF EVOLUTION:
AMERICAN SCIENTISTS AND THE HEREDITY-ENVIRONMENT CONTROVERSY, 1900–1941, at 89–
153 (1978); FARIS, supra note 112, at 3–37; MARY O. FURNER, ADVOCACY & OBJECTIVITY: A
CRISIS IN THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1865–1905, at 11–34
(1975); THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE
AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS OF
AUTHORITY 24–47 (1977); ROSS, supra note 96, at 91–99.
121. See ROBBINS, supra note 55, at 87–88 (addressing critique that preferences cannot
be observed, but that behavior can be, so behaviorism would provide a better tool for
economic analysis).
122. Id. at 87.
123. BLAUG, supra note 10, at 700.
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Maurice Clark, Wesley Clair Mitchell, Walton Hamilton, Rex Tugwell, and a little
later John R. Commons and Morris Copeland, identified a set of economic
positions that distinguished their views from those of the prevailing marginalism.124
Their acknowledged champion was Thorstein Veblen, whose productive period
was largely over by the early 1920s. Veblen spent much of his career attacking
marginalism and neoclassicism for not taking Darwinian theory into account.
Veblen was the most explicitly Darwinian of the major institutionalists,
emphasizing the role of survival instincts in forming individual preferences as well
as social institutions themselves.125 Veblen thought of human choice in terms of
“habits” rather than preferences, and habits were entirely the product of evolution.
Within this model, Veblen believed that marginalist theory was positively harmful
and that marginalism’s continual search for equilibrium was misguided, given that
evolution knows no equilibrium but is continuously rematching environment and
the organisms contained in it.126 For Veblen, institutions were human creations for
directing wealth, power, and social control. They were entirely a product of
evolution, and they were worthy of economic study because they tended to be of
much longer duration than the individuals who lived in them. An institution was “a
usage which has become axiomatic and indispensable by habituation and general
acceptance.”127
While all of the institutionalists were influenced by the theory of evolution and
the emergent American social sciences, explicitly Darwinian rhetoric was less
prominent in the writings of the inter-war institutionalists than it had been in
Veblen. By and large, however, the institutionalists were evolutionists in their
biology and increasingly after 1920, behaviorists in their psychology. For example,
Hamilton emphasized the importance of using social psychology rather than

124. See John Maurice Clark, The Socializing of Theoretical Economics, in THE TREND
73 (Rexford Guy Tugwell ed., 1924) [hereinafter Clark, Socializing]; Walton
H. Hamilton, The Institutional Approach to Economic Theory, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 309 (Supp.
1919); Rexford Guy Tugwell, Experimental Economics, in THE TREND OF ECONOMICS 371
(Rexford Guy Tugwell ed., 1924); see also ROSS, supra note 112, at 407–08; Roger E.
Backhouse, The Transformation of U.S. Economics, 1920–1960, Viewed Through a Survey
of Journal Articles, 30 HIST. POL. ECON. 85 (Supp. 1998); Geoffrey M. Hodgson, John R.
Commons and the Foundations of Institutional Economics, 37 J. ECON. ISSUES 547 (2003);
Malcolm Rutherford, Understanding Institutional Economics: 1918–1929, 22 J. HIST. ECON.
THOUGHT 277 (2000).
125. For a good analysis, see HODGSON, supra note 10.
126. See Thorstein Veblen, The Limitations of Marginal Utility, 17 J. POL. ECON. 620
(1909) [hereinafter Veblen, Limitations]; Thorstein Veblen, The Preconceptions of
Economic Science (pt. 3), 14 Q.J. ECON. 240 (1900); Thorstein Veblen, Why Is Economics
Not an Evolutionary Science?, 12 Q.J. ECON. 373 (1898). Veblen’s other works particularly
related to the development of institutionalism include THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE
OWNERSHIP: BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT TIMES (1923) [hereinafter VEBLEN, ABSENTEE
OWNERSHIP]; THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904) [hereinafter
VEBLEN, BUSINESS ENTERPRISE]; THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS
(1899). On Veblen, institutionalism, and the business corporation, see Forest G. Hill, Veblen,
Berle and the Modern Corporation, 26 AM. J. ECON. SOC. 279 (1967).
127. VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP, supra note 126, at 101 n.1.
OF ECONOMICS
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marginalist theory in order to understand human economic behavior.128 Lawrence
Kelso Frank, a Columbia-trained economist who spent much of his career at the
Rockefeller Foundation, made a powerful plea for more behaviorist theory in
economics.129 Wesley Mitchell, who served as president of both the American
Economics Association and the American Statistical Association and later on
became a major theoretician of social planning during the New Deal, called
repeatedly for a more behavioral approach to economics.130
One theme that dominates much of the history writing about the institutionalists
is that behaviorism led to their downfall.131 As a principle of human action,
behaviorism was sharply in conflict with marginalism because it was hostile toward
any concept that involved a hypothesis about state of mind, including valuation.
The behaviorists did not speak about anything as rational as valuation at the
margin, but rather about “impulse,” and the origins of these behaviors lay deep in
biological development and the struggle for survival. Marginalism as a value theory
seemed uniquely descriptive of human beings as opposed to lower animals; but the
behaviorists believed that thought was no different from a body’s other physical
processes and that, in this regard, all organisms are alike.132 Further, the scientist
can observe only the behaviors, not any rational value scheme that might serve to
rationalize them.133 These views created an uneasy relationship at best with a
profession obsessed with the elegant mathematics that marginalist analysis was
producing. In sharp contrast, behaviorist social science in the 1920s and 1930s was
highly empirical and never developed a unifying theory with predictive power. The
result was empirical studies that aggregated enormous amounts of factual matter
but without important, testable unifying conclusions.134 Coase himself would later

128. See Hamilton, supra note 124, at 316.
129. See Lawrence K. Frank, The Emancipation of Economics, 14 AM. ECON. REV. 17
(1924).
130. See Mitchell’s collected essays in WESLEY CLAIR MITCHELL, THE BACKWARD ART
OF SPENDING MONEY (1937).
131. See Malcolm Rutherford, American Institutionalism and the History of Economics,
19 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 178, 178–79 (1997); see also Malcolm Rutherford, Veblen’s
Evolutionary Programme: A Promise Unfulfilled, 22 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 463 (1998).
132. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 106–09 (1922).
133. See, e.g., Pier Franceso Asso & Luca Fiorito, Waging War Against Mechanical
Man: The Knight-Copeland Controversy over Behaviorism in Economics, in 21-A
RESEARCH IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND METHODOLOGY 65 (Warren J.
Samuels & Jeff E. Biddle eds., 2003); Morris A. Copeland, Economic Theory and the
Natural Science Point of View, 21 AM. ECON. REV. 67 (1931). University of Chicago
economist Frank Knight, who toyed with various aspects of institutionalism throughout his
career, was very critical of behaviorism because its list of “instincts” defied rigorous
analysis. See Frank H. Knight, Ethics and the Economic Interpretation, 36 Q.J. ECON. 454,
467 (1922) (“If instincts are to be scientifically useful, it must surely be possible to get some
idea of their number and identity. But there has always been substantially unanimous
disagreement on this point. Logically the choice seems to lie between a meaningless single
instinct to do things-in-general and the equally meaningless hypothesis of a separate instinct
for every possible act.”).
134. On behaviorism in American institutionalism, see generally Shira B. Lewin,
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describe the work of the institutionalists as “not theoretical but anti-theoretical.”135
The same can be said of the legal realists, who were the legal counterpart of
institutionalism and who together produced an impressive mass of interdisciplinary
empirical scholarship.136 Robert L. Hale, an institutionalist economist who wrote
mainly on legal issues, was among the first American academics to have a joint
appointment at the law school and economics department at Columbia
University.137
One characteristic of institutionalism, both new and old, is that by broadening
the reach of economic analysis beyond traditional markets, it is able to capture a
more complete set of the mechanisms by which resources are moved from one
place to another. As Karl Polanyi, who was sympathetic with American
institutionalism, so powerfully observed in 1944, markets composed of traders and
voluntary exchange have accounted for only a small fraction of the movement of
resources throughout history.138 Families, tribes, governments, firms, gift giving,
Economics and Psychology: Lessons for Our Own Day from the Early Twentieth Century, 34
J. ECON. LITERATURE 1293 (1996); Malcolm Rutherford, Institutionalism Between the Wars,
34 J. ECON. ISSUES 291, 298 (2000). For a very good discussion of the development of
behaviorist psychology among institutionalists as an alternative to neoclassical marginal
utility theory, see Pier Francesco Asso & Luca Fiorito, Human Nature and Economic
Institutions: Instinct, Psychology, Behaviorism and the Development of American
Institutionalism (Univ. of Siena Dep’t of Political Econ., Working Paper No. 373, 2002),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=433763; see also ROSS,
supra note 96, at 414–15 (describing tumultuous meeting of American Economics
Association in 1927, where a large majority of economists reacted against the use of
empirical analysis to revise economic theory as a throwback to German-style historicism).
135. Ronald H. Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 140 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 229, 230 (1984). Lionel Robbins was even harsher, describing them as
“muddled and slightly disturbed.” Lionel Robbins, Foreword to DAVID SECKLER, THORSTEIN
VEBLEN AND THE INSTITUTIONALISTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS, at
ix (1975).
136. A few examples include Charles E. Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration, 2
CONN. B.J. 211 (1928); William O. Douglas & J. Howard Marshall, A Factual Study of
Bankruptcy Administration and Some Suggestions, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 25 (1932); Underhill
Moore & Theodore S. Hope, Jr., An Institutional Approach to the Law of Commercial
Banking, 38 YALE L.J. 703 (1929); Underhill Moore & Gilbert Sussman, Legal and
Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts, 40 YALE L.J. 381, 555,
752, 928, 1055, 1219 (1931) (series of articles describing empirical studies). On the
relationship between institutionalism and American legal realism, see Herbert Hovenkamp,
Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 84
MINN. L. REV. 805 (2000) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Knowledge About Welfare]; see also
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995)
(describing rise and decline of empirical legal research by Legal Realists).
137. See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT
HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 10–15 (1998).
138. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 45–69 (Beacon Press 2001) (1944)
(“In spite of the chorus of academic incantations so persistent in the nineteenth century, gain
and profit made on exchange never before played an important part in human economy.”);
see also John Adams, The Corporation Versus the Market, 26 J. ECON. ISSUES 397, 397–98
(1992) (comparing Coase’s and Polanyi’s concepts of exchange); Abraham Rotstein, Karl
Polanyi’s Concept of Non-Market Trade, 30 J. ECON. HIST. 117 (1970). On Polanyi and
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and a miscellany of other institutions have been responsible for most of it.139
Further, these alternative forms have often either reflected or produced much
greater amounts of social solidarity than has the highly individualistic theory of
competition underlying market exchange.140
The historical and economic literature on American institutionalism is
enormous, and this discussion offers only a brief description of this diverse group
of economists, who did most of their work between World War I and the onset of
the Great Depression. With some exceptions, they shared severe doubts about the
efficacy of marginalism as a unifying explanatory model for economics. As a
result, they largely rejected or ignored ordinalism, which is entirely derivative of
marginalism. The institutionalist objection was not that they thought that
interpersonal comparisons of utility were possible. Much more fundamentally, they
disputed the premise that marginal utility defines economic welfare at all. Further,
while neoclassicism tended to emphasize the radically individualistic and
idiosyncratic nature of human preference, the behaviorist psychology that
institutionalists employed emphasized its similarity. Organisms of the same species
thrust into the same environment tend to respond in the same way.
The relation between institutionalism and Darwinism was complex and evolved
from Veblen’s explicitly evolutionary rhetoric at the beginning of the century to a
more empirical behaviorism in the 1920s.141 Most importantly, as their name
implies, they believed that “institutions” deserve more explicit recognition in
economic analysis than neoclassical economics had given them. Significantly, the
institutionalists did not all agree with each other even on these fundamental tenets.
For example, Thorstein Veblen was extremely hostile toward marginalist
analysis,142 while John Maurice Clark believed it was essential.143 John R.
Commons understood marginalist analysis and frequently used it,144 but it played a
much smaller role in his economic theory than it did in that of the neoclassicists.
Institutionalism’s popularity within economic theory was short lived. Its
practitioners became isolated, mainly because they never formed consensus on any
methodological principle with sustained intellectual power. Institutionalist

institutionalism, see Walter C. Neale, Karl Polanyi and American Institutionalism: A
Strange Case of Convergence, in THE LIFE AND WORK OF KARL POLANYI 145 (Kari PolanyiLevitt ed., 1990); see also Avner Greif, Coercion and Exchange: How Did Markets Evolve?
(Stanford Univ. Working Paper, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1304204
(comparing coercive and exchange economies and identifying secure property rights and
contract enforceability as the distinguishing factors). See generally AVNER GREIF,
INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE
(2006).
139. See POLANYI, supra note 138, at 45–69.
140. See id.
141. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Frank, An Institutional Analysis of the Law, 24 COLUM. L.
REV. 480, 482–84 (1924) (using cultural anthropology to account for institutions of private
property and contract). On this point, see HODGSON, supra note 10.
142. See Veblen, Limitations, supra note 126.
143. On Clark’s marginalism, see infra Part III.D.
144. In particular, see JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: ITS P LACE IN
POLITICAL ECONOMY (Transaction Publishers 4th prtg. 1990) (1934) [hereinafter COMMONS,
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS].
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economic writing too often decayed into descriptive, polemic historicism.145 It
never developed a rhetorically powerful and technically useable equivalent of
neoclassicism’s concept of declining marginal utility, Darwin’s natural selection, or
Einstein’s general theory.
At the same time, however, old institutionalism contained a set of political
ideologies that was attractive to noneconomists during a period in which historians
and social commentators were generally moving toward the left while neoclassical
economics was moving toward the right. As a result, institutionalism has always
occupied a place in American intellectual and political history that is quite out of
proportion to the place it occupies in economic doctrine.146 By contrast, in
mainstream histories of economics, the classical political economists and the
prominent neoclassicists are given generous treatment, while institutionalists are
ignored or barely mentioned.147
The early institutionalists’ main critiques of neoclassicism, and marginalism in
particular, were that it was too abstract and lacked empirical content; that it
elevated rationality over evolution as a device for explaining human choice; and
perhaps most importantly, that it was overly focused on market exchange as the
dominant method of social interaction. The last point is crucial because it reveals a
debate about the “scope” of economics that is quite different from the scope that
Lionel Robbins envisioned.148
Most of the institutionalists, including the legal realists, were very conscious of
the power that some social institutions wield over individuals. They were typically
hostile toward the neoclassical search for models of competition in which
individual actors were powerless and everyone was regarded as having infinite
freedom to make any exchange that he or she pleased. When institutionalists

145. Joseph Schumpeter’s critique was particularly harsh, notwithstanding his own
sympathy with historical methods generally. He lumped the institutionalists together with
practical nonacademic economists who wrote about policy and had no use for theory:
They . . . looked upon ‘marginalism’ as a sort of speculative philosophy or as a
new sectarian ‘ism’ which it was precisely their business to eliminate by what
they considered truly scientific and realistic research. Hence they passed, in
methodological and programmatic pronouncements, all sorts of sweeping
judgments upon it. On the surface, the result was bedlam, especially in
Germany and in the United States—a multitude of discordant voices, all of
which seemed to testify to the presence of an impasse.
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 954 (Elizabeth Boody
Schumpeter ed., Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 1996) (1954) (internal citation omitted).
146. Cf. COMMAGER, supra note 99, at 227–46 (1950) (lengthy discussion of Veblen,
while John Bates Clark is barely mentioned and incorrectly identified as a “classical
economist”); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955) (much greater treatment of
Veblen than Clark); WHITE, supra note 99 (lengthy discussion of Veblen but no reference to
John Bates Clark or Irving Fisher).
147. See, e.g., BLAUG, supra note 10, at 700–03 (briefly describing American
institutionalism).
148. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text (arguing that Robbins narrowed the
scope of economics so as to exclude psychology); James Ronald Stanfield, The Scope,
Method and Significance of Original Institutional Economics, 33 J. ECON. ISSUES 231, 233–
36 (1999).
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thought about the economic system, they tended to see monopoly as a much bigger
problem than the neoclassicists did. They also tended to view business corporations
as institutions that wielded great power and were inclined to use it irresponsibly—a
theme that stretches across institutionalist and legal realist writings from Veblen149
to Richard T. Ely,150 Robert L. Hale,151 John Maurice Clark (and his work on social
control of business),152 John R. Commons,153 and culminates in Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means’s influential New Deal book, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property.154
Finally, at least one important American institutionalist, John R. Commons, was
heavily concerned with the relationship between institutions and transactions—
which gives him a unique place in New Institutional Economics (NIE).155
Commons’s conception of “transactions” was broader than the conception
generally used in NIE. In a lengthy discussion of transactions in Legal Foundations
of Capitalism, written in 1924, Commons developed a theory of institutions as
“going concerns” governed by “working rules,” and whose principal resource
deployment device was the “transaction.” However, for Commons, transactions
came in three kinds: rationing transactions, managerial transactions, and bargaining
transactions.156 Both rationing and managerial transactions were hierarchical in the
sense that they were between a legally superior person and a legally inferior one.
Rationing transactions were events such as a legislature’s passage of a tax or tariff
bill, or a judicial decision that transferred wealth from one person to another. By
contrast, managerial transactions were mainly private and referred mainly to the
employment relationship, although it also included other institutions such as
slavery. Only “bargaining transactions” involved voluntary contractual exchanges
between legally equal persons.157

149. VEBLEN, BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, supra note 126; VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP,
supra note 126.
150. RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (1914); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law &
Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993 (1990).
151. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); see also Frank, supra note 141, at 481–89 (describing evolution of
coercion in historical cultures, including legal rules among other structural norms and
taboos).
152. JOHN M. CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1926) [hereinafter CLARK, SOCIAL
CONTROL].
153. JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924) [hereinafter
COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS].
154. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 46.
155. The writings of Oliver E. Williamson are representative of NIE. See, e.g.,
WILLIAMSON, supra note 9, at 12, 26, 45, 220, 251, 371; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 3–10 (1985); WILLIAMSON, supra note 42, at 3, 6,
24, 254.
156. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 144, at 59–72.
157. Id. For some of those sympathetic with institutionalism, such as Richard T. Ely and
Robert L. Hale, even bargaining transactions were seen as coercive because they tended to
reinforce pre-existing distributions of power and increased the maldistribution of wealth in
the process. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 150; Hale, supra note 151. These views eventually
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Commons defined institutions as organizations that manifest collective action
“in control of individual action.”158 In order to exercise such control, institutions
had to develop “working rules,” which are rules that specify transactions, or
movements of rights or resources among individuals, that create order within the
institution. Once again, Commons’s definitions were very broad. Common law
contract rules are certainly working rules, but so are language, customs, and habits.
These “rules are necessary and their survival in history is contingent on their fitness
to hold together in a continuing concern the overweening and unlimited selfishness
of individuals pressed on by scarcity of resources.”159
In 1925, Commons wrote an essay on “law and economics” which appeared in
the Yale Law Journal.160 In his essay he urged greater study of the relationship
between market transacting and the legal system. In particular, he observed, the
coalescence of these two institutions, the economic market and the legal system,
created the possibility of transactions in absentia by substituting for commodities
themselves a concept of legal control over them. In “primitive markets,”
commodities and consideration exchanged hands simultaneously, but in modern
economies the legal system facilitated mechanisms by which the transaction and
the movement of the resource itself could be widely separated events.161
One of institutionalism’s most durable contributions was that it increased
economic analysis of the legal system—particularly the role of property rights in
economic exchange. Almost simultaneously, legal scholars at elite institutions such
as Yale and Columbia began to pay more attention to economic markets and to the
relation between markets and legal rules (both common law and statutory).162 To be

found their way into judicial decision making and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (describing the destruction of
contract theory at the hands of legal realists, such as Benjamin Cardozo and Arthur L.
Corbin, and the incorporation of these views into the Second Restatement of Contracts).
158. See COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 144, at 72 (“From this
universal principle of collective action in control of individual action by different kinds of
sanctions arise the ethical and legal relations of rights, duties, no-rights, no-duties, and the
economic relations not only of Security, Conformity, Liberty, and Exposure, but also of
Assets and Liabilities.”).
159. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 153, at 138. On Commons’s theory of
transactions, see BEN B. SELIGMAN, MAIN CURRENTS IN MODERN ECONOMICS 159–78 (1962);
Bruce E. Kaufman, The Institutional Economics of John R. Commons: Complement and
Substitute for Neoclassical Economic Theory, 5 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 3, 22–34 (2007);
Malcolm Rutherford, J.R. Commons’s Institutional Economics, 17 J. ECON. ISSUES 721
(1983).
160. John R. Commons, Law and Economics, 34 YALE L.J. 371 (1925).
161. On the relationship between Commons, Coase, and The Nature of the Firm, see
Steven G. Medema, Ronald Coase and American Institutionalism, in 14 RESEARCH IN THE
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND METHODOLOGY 51, 68–70 (Warren J. Samuels & Jeff
E. Biddle eds., 1996).
162. An excellent but typically overlooked example is Lawrence Kelso Frank, whose
1924 Columbia Law Review article, An Institutionalist Analysis of Law, described the
evolution of property and contract as social norms, much like tribal taboos, but which had
become much more social (rather than individual) as a result of the revolution in “machine
production,” which Frank believed gave rise to legal rules that emphasized cooperation more
than individualism. See Frank, supra note 141. Frank argued that the movement for the new
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sure, they were by and large not marginalists. Further, they tended to see various
institutions, such as the legal system and the market system, as coordinate and as
having their own values and operating rules. That is, they did not view all
institutions through the lens of price theory.163
Legal realism was the companion of institutionalism, but only in legal theory.
While legal realists championed the study of law and economics, they rarely
promoted neoclassical economists. They were by and large not marginalists, and in
any event they did not accept marginalism as an exclusive or even dominant theory
of value. Their theory of choice was heavily behaviorist, and they were Darwinian
in their thinking about the relationship between people and their environment.
When they looked at traditional markets, they tended to see a great deal of
monopoly, market failure, and coercion rather than competition. The legal realists
tended to view markets and governments as alternative ways of allocating
resources, and they tended to have at least as much confidence in government as in
markets as resource allocation devices. Finally, they preceded, rejected, or ignored
the severe constraints on neoclassical welfare economics posed by the ordinalist
revolution. As a result, their approach to welfare rested mainly on Darwinian
objective welfare judgments. However, they facilitated the interdisciplinary study
of law and economics more than any group of intellectuals that preceded them.164
III. COASE: FROM NEOCLASSICISM TO NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
A. Coase and Old Institutionalism
Throughout his career Coase professed a firm belief that institutions do matter,
and that neoclassical economics tended toward too much abstraction. He shared
these two fundamental principles with the first generation of institutionalists. At the
same time, however, Coase rejected the institutionalists’ severe limitations on
marginalist analysis. Beginning with The Nature of the Firm in 1937,165 Coase used
exclusively marginalist criteria to define the behavior of economic agents and
continued to do so throughout his career, including his analysis of bargaining and
the common law in The Problem of Social Cost.166 For Coase, as for any
neoclassicist, the business firm was no different than the individual equating
utilities at the margin, except that the firm’s utilities were in fact profits and losses
that could be quantified by price theory. In the hands of later followers, Coasean
institutionalism reached other types of institutions as well, including governments,

Restatements of the law, which were just underway at the time of his writing, were an effort
to bridge the hyper-individualistic tendencies of nineteenth-century law with the realities of
coordinated production in the machine age. He saw this as a failed attempt to “pour new
wine into old bottles.” Id. at 491–92. He ultimately concluded that legislative rather than
common law rules were the preferred route for legal change. Id. at 495.
163. The phrase, somewhat misplaced, comes from Richard A. Posner, The Chicago
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1979) (speaking of viewing all of
antitrust law through the lens of “price theory”).
164. See Hovenkamp, Knowledge About Welfare, supra note 136.
165. Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 26.
166. Coase, Problem of Social Cost, supra note 1.
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interest groups and lobbyists, families, religion, labor unions, educational
institutions, and clubs, to name a few.167
Second, to the extent he expressed his views on the subject at all, he sided with
ordinalism in the debate over interpersonal utility comparisons. This separated him
from the first generation of institutionalists, whose theories of welfare were
generally not based on marginal utility functions at all. While Coase’s writing was
dominated by concerns for identifying welfare-enhancing outcomes, welfare in his
conception concerns two things. First, it refers to the individual rankings of an
economic actor’s own internal priorities, as in The Nature of the Firm. Second, it
refers to the results of unconstrained private bargaining, as in The Problem of
Social Cost. Within this system, welfare gains occur only when parties are able to
bargain at suitably low cost, or else when the legal system emulates the outcome
that people would have achieved had they been able to bargain. There is not much
place for any notion that involuntary transfers from, say, the wealthy to the poor
will increase welfare. Coase was consistently opposed to government intervention
in the economy. In sum, Coasean analysis is purely neoclassical in the sense that it
identifies the welfare maximizing outcome as the one that people would choose
through voluntary exchange, provided that transaction costs are suitably low.
While predecessors such as Pigou wrote extensively about the costs of moving
resources, as a pre-ordinalist Pigou tended to look at the full range of interventions
by which resources are moved.168 The importance of the Coasean shift in emphasis
is difficult to exaggerate. Although Coase had little to say about the debate over
interpersonal utility comparisons that was swirling around him at the London
School of Economics,169 his reduction of the cost of moving resources to
“transaction costs” meant that Coasean economics measured welfare entirely by
reference to individual decisions that were efficient in the Pareto sense. This
amounted to nothing short of a “neoclassical takeover” of institutionalism.
B. The Business Firm and Institutionalism, Old and New
For most institutionalists, the business firm deserved special study because it
was such an obvious exception to the neoclassical supposition that resources are
allocated through markets. Firms were in fact aggregations of individuals,
collections of plants and other productive units related both horizontally and
vertically, and composed of owners, managers, and workers. At least in private
commerce, most resource redeployment occurred with the involvement of at least

167. See, e.g., NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: A GUIDEBOOK (Eric Brousseau & JeanMichel Glachant eds., 2008) (contributions discussing wide range of institutions);
HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds.,
2005) (similar); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990); Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics and
Development (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/
NewInstE.North.pdf (explaining how developmental policy is determined by
institutionalism).
168. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text; see also Hovenkamp, Coasean
Markets, supra note 18.
169. See supra notes 43–70 and accompanying text.
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one firm. Nevertheless, the relationships among the numerous individuals that
functioned inside a firm hardly fit the neoclassical idea of a market.
What provoked so many institutionalists was that in their view the neoclassicists
solved this problem by murder. Neoclassical economics largely ignored questions
about the nonmarket relationships and decision making that go on inside the firm.
To them, the firm was simply an “economic agent”—a black box that transacted in
the market in the same way that a natural person transacted, but whose internal
preference orderings were no more scrutable than the unevaluated but sacrosanct
preference orderings of a single individual. The one big difference between the firm
and the human being was that the firm had a profit function that maximized wealth,
while the human being maximized utility. This explains why the ordinalist
revolution never affected price theory and industrial organization in the way it
affected welfare economics and the economics of public policy. A business firm’s
wealth could be specified in cardinal units, such as pounds or dollars, and could be
compared from one actor to another.
The brilliance of Coase’s The Nature of the Firm was to merge marginalism and
institutionalism by applying marginal analysis to the firm’s internal decision
making and thus to questions about its size and structure. However, Coase was not
the first economist to conceive of the problem in this fashion. By 1937, there was
already an important marginalist literature on the internal workings of the firm and
the determinants of its size, including the rationales for vertical integration, or a
firm’s decision to produce an input for itself rather than purchase it on the market.
One important older linkage between marginalism and firm structure was Alfred
Marshall’s 1919 book Industry and Trade, described above.170 Much of the
literature on vertical integration related to production cost savings.171 There was
also a strong tendency, stretching from the 1910s through the New Deal, to see
vertical integration as a monopoly problem.172
The ideas of several economists who wrote in the 1920s deserve special
mention, however, for they expressly related questions about firm size and structure
to the issues of incentives and, in some cases, the costs of using the market. These
were Lawrence Frank’s discussion of coordination problems attending the rise of
machine production, John Maurice Clark’s pathbreaking study of Overhead Costs,
and Pigou’s, Kaldor’s, and E.A.G. Robinson’s important marginalist analyses of
the equilibrium business firm.

170. MARSHALL, INDUSTRY AND TRADE, supra note 38; see supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., William Franklin Willoughby, The Integration of Industry in the United
States, 16 Q.J. ECON. 94, 108 (1902) (describing the development of vertical integration by
English store owners). For an overview of vertical integration during this period, see
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 25; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and
the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105 (1989) [hereinafter Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Movement]; Hovenkamp, Law of Vertical Integration, supra note 38.
172. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION: A STUDY OF THE
EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 441–45 (1936); Hovenkamp, Antitrust Movement, supra
note 171, at 164–67.
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C. Lawrence Kelso Frank
Lawrence Kelso Frank’s theory of vertical integration, developed in an essay
written in 1925, was based on a comparison of the costs of internal production as
opposed to market acquisition. For Frank, an important cost of using the market in
the machine age was the cost of coordination.173 He argued that firms had been
vertically integrated prior to the industrial revolution because hand craftsmen
tended to perform all of their operations internally, from obtaining source materials
to producing and marketing a product.174 The rise of machine production, however,
led to much larger output but much smaller vertical size, as machines tended to
perform discrete, repetitive functions at high speed.175 Machines also had to be kept
in production at rates that were not driven by immediate demand, however, and this
led to a market coordination problem. The result, Frank explained, was two-fold:
development of more elaborate contractual coordination and the rise of modern
vertical ownership integration. Ultimately, he argued, vertical ownership
integration proved superior in most cases.176 But Frank drew these conclusions,
which clearly anticipated Coase, comparing the costs of the market with those of
vertical ownership:
It is instructive to contrast this method of co-ordinating the several
stages of production in an industry, with reliance upon the pecuniary
relationships of buying and selling, where production is governed by
fluctuating market prices, a multitude of individual contracts or orders
subject to cancellation, the guesses and expectations of salesmen, and
above all by the widespread practice of speculative purchasing which
alternately overbuys and then refrains from buying while using up
accumulated stocks.177
D. Clark and Overhead Costs
John Maurice Clark was one of the most incisive economists of the business
firm during the interwar period. Clark sat somewhat uncomfortably between the
marginal utility theory, of which his father John Bates Clark had been a champion,
and the institutionalism of the 1920s, of which he considered himself a member.

173. Lawrence K. Frank, The Significance of Industrial Integration, 33 J. POL. ECON. 179
(1925).
174. Id. at 179–80.
175. Id. at 180 (“[T]he machine process split up production into an ever growing number
of separate processes, separate because of the invention of new techniques and new
machines for performing each step in the formerly unified handicraft operations.”).
176. Id. at 185–86 (“For undoubtedly vertical integration is an attempt to bring together
under one management the separate stages of the industrial process which technically require
unified direction and control. Since this technical requirement cannot effectively nor
continuously be met through buying and selling of goods between separately owned stages,
however ingeniously and elaborately those pecuniary operations be conducted, it has become
both feasible and desirable to bring a number of consecutive stages of production under one
managerial control.”).
177. Id. at 190.
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Like many institutionalists, he was a pragmatist, more interested in workable
solutions than in doctrinal purity. In 1921 he criticized neoclassical economics for
being too “Euclidean,” and for using its mathematics to obfuscate rather than
illuminate social issues.178 His 1926 book entitled Social Control of Business was
heavily influenced by the social science movement and intended to show the need
for more social concern in and public regulation of private enterprise.179 In 1930 he
argued that neoclassical economics had become far too individualistic and needed
to articulate a social agenda.180 Later in his career, he wrote a formative policy
essay on “workable competition,” designed to create a set of antitrust rules that
would avoid being continually frustrated by an overtly pure conception of perfect
competition.181
In the early 1920s, Clark made a sustained attempt to use marginalist analysis to
explore the internal decision making of the business firm. The book, entitled
Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs, dealt with a problem that had vexed
neoclassical economics since the time of Marshall, which was an antinomy
between the theory of perfect competition and the presence of fixed costs.182 Prices
are always determined by decision making on the margin, and under perfect
competition they are driven to marginal cost. That is, a firm will produce one more
unit if the incremental cost of making and selling it is no greater than the market
price. Beginning with the “barren tautology” that the competitive price equals
marginal cost, Alfred Marshall chose to ignore most of the internal workings of the
firm and instead introduced the hypothetical idea of a “representative firm” that
held in common the unexplored but efficient characteristics of firms operating in a
particular market.183 This permitted Marshall to talk about firms without troubling
himself very much about the differences among them.
Under the Marshallian model, however, there was no profitable equilibrium for
firms in competitively structured markets with significant fixed costs. A fixed cost
is an investment in something like land, plants, equipment, or research and
development that does not vary with production and that must be paid whether or
not the firm produces anything. Fixed costs create the concept of “overhead,” or
costs unrelated to the incremental costs of making an additional unit and selling it.
Within Marshall’s model, competition was thought to become “ruinous” as each
firm cut its price to marginal cost without having enough left over to pay off fixed
costs. Firms would either go out of business until only a single monopoly firm
remained or else they would be forced to collude. This “fixed cost controversy” had

178. John Maurice Clark, Soundings in Non-Euclidian Economics, 11 AM. ECON. REV.
SUPP. 132 (1921).
179. CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL, supra note 152; see Herbert Hovenkamp, United States
Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311, 323–24 (2009) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, Competition Policy].
180. Clark, Socializing, supra note 124.
181. J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241,
241–43 (1940); see Hovenkamp, Competition Policy, supra note 179, at 323, 342–43.
182. J. MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923)
[hereinafter CLARK, OVERHEAD COSTS].
183. Id. at 13.
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a major impact on antitrust policy in the United States during the early decades of
the twentieth century.184
Clark observed that fixed costs were an increasingly important aspect of the
business firm under modern methods of mechanized production. Overhead Costs
explored the many ways that firms make choices so as to maximize their position
given the presence of fixed costs, and some of these choices pertained to vertical
integration, also the subject of Coase’s The Nature of the Firm.
Clark’s book claimed a great deal. Market demand was constantly in flux, but in
industries with significant fixed costs productive capacity was inelastic, or not
subject to much variation.185 Business production could not expand or contract on a
moment’s notice in response to market conditions. Once machinery was in place,
high output led to low costs but also to a potentially disastrous loss of investment in
the case of a shutdown. Examination of these problems provided Clark, just as
Lawrence Frank, a basis in fixed costs for a theory of business cycles, which
explained the tendency of capitalist economies to swing from boom to bust.186
Clark applied his theory first to industries with obviously high fixed costs, such as
railroads187 and public utilities,188 but then generalized to all of modern
manufacturing. He found that the problem of fixed costs affected numerous
decisions concerning capital, labor, and selection of raw materials. “From being a
mere exception to the general laws of value and efficiency,” Clark wrote, the study

184. See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 25, at 308–22; see also George
Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe
Case, 25 J.L. & ECON. 201 (1982); George Bittlingmayer, The Economic Problem of Fixed
Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 739 (1989). The
cost controversy culminated in the 1930s in a debate that gave rise to modern theories of
imperfect competition. See Nahid Aslanbeigui, The Cost Controversy: Pigouvian Economics
in Disequilibrium, 3 EUR. J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 275 (1996); Roberto Marchionatti, On the
Methodological Foundation of Modern Microeconomics: Frank Knight and the “Cost
Controversy” in the 1920s, 35 HIST. POL. ECON. 49 (2003).
185. CLARK, OVERHEAD COSTS, supra note 182, at ix (introducing the book as “a study
of discrepancies between an ever fluctuating demand and a relatively inelastic fund of
productive capacity, resulting in wastes of partial idleness, and many other economic
disturbances. Unused capacity is its central theme”).
186. Frank made similar observations in Institutionalist Analysis. Frank, supra note 141,
at 491. He noted that, historically, under hand-production there was a close relationship
between output and prices because production was responsive to demand virtually on a unitby-unit basis. By contrast, machine production led for the need of machines that kept
running at high output regardless of demand. This fact, plus the offsetting correctives made
by managers, led to booms and busts as industries swung between over- and underproduction. Joseph Schumpeter’s massive study of business cycles came almost two decades
later but developed many of the same points with copious historical examples. JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL, AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS (1939). While Schumpeter poured his soul into the book, it is
largely regarded today as his least successful. See Thomas K. McCraw, Schumpeter’s
Business Cycles as Business History, 80 BUS. HIS. REV. 231, 231 (2006).
187. CLARK, OVERHEAD COSTS, supra note 182, at 258–97.
188. Id. at 318–34.
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of overhead costs “has grown to be a large and important section of economic
principles.”189
Clark also discussed the relationship between overhead costs and the nature of
the firm. Many of his observations about why firms integrate vertically would
resemble those made by Coase fifteen years later in The Nature of the Firm. Some
of them anticipated the transaction costs economics of vertical integration and
contracting in the 1970s.190 One consequence of vertical integration, Clark
observed, is that it often changed the nature of a firm’s costs from variable to fixed;
by contrast, the market tends to preserve costs as variable and as a result fails to
recognize the true impact of overhead costs.191 A consistent theme in Overhead
Costs is that fixed costs and high-volume machine output means that manufacturing
and orders cannot be synchronized on a day-by-day basis. Machines must either run
or be shut down. While in the long run there might be equilibrium between supply
and demand, the modern firm could expect to face periods of over- and undersupply. The greater the proportion of a firm’s fixed costs, the more extreme these
cycles would be.192 This need for constancy of output in the face of cycling
business conditions created a tremendous coordination problem, both upstream and
downstream. Clark conducted a simple thought experiment, imagining a world in
which all production and distribution of a finished good was in the hands of a firm
owned by its workers. In that setting, he concluded, many of these coordination
problems would go away because this hypothetical firm would be in a better
position to shift productive resources to the place where they would be needed the
most.193
But in the real world coordination problems are substantial. Clark argued that
they provided the basis for a manager’s decision about when to contract out and
when to produce internally. Clark anticipated a theory of information
“impactedness,”194 namely, that each manager knows his own business far better
than the business of others and that learning about the others is costly.195 As a
result, a business firm might find that internal production would be more reliable
than trusting another firm as seller or purchaser of an intermediate product.196 Not
only would this address the coordination problem, Clark suggested, but it would
also reduce collateral costs of reliance on the market, namely, the “work of
negotiation, bargaining, higgling, stimulating demand (on the part of the seller)[,]

189. Id. at ix.
190. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON.
297 (1978) (applying transaction cost economics to problems of vertical contracting);
WILLIAMSON, supra note 42 (same).
191. CLARK, OVERHEAD COSTS, supra note 182, at 23–24, 403–07.
192. Id. at 386.
193. Id. at 402.
194. Cf. WILLIAMSON, supra note 42, at 31–33.
195. CLARK, OVERHEAD COSTS, supra note 182, at 136–37.
196. Id. at 137 (“[A]nother gain from integration arises, in the shape of great reliability
in the supplying of materials. The two concerns adapt their process to each other, and the
supply of materials, both in quality and regularity, can be more carefully suited to the needs
of the user . . . .”).
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testing qualities (on the part of the buyer), and much of the other work of buying
and selling.”197 Clark also argued for a concept of “intellectual overhead,” which
recognized that information is not only impacted, but it is also fixed in that, once
obtained, it can be stretched over any volume of output. This made having one’s
own information more valuable as output grew larger.198
Business cycles entailed that market prices would not necessarily move in
relation to demand. This affected the firm not only as a seller of its own product,
but also as a buyer of raw materials.199 Fixed costs could also lead to inefficient risk
distribution, Clark argued, because those firms who had mainly variable costs
would be in a position to shift the risks of over- and under-supply to firms with
high fixed cost.200 This created a need for longer-term contracting and special
attention to the problem of “renewals,” which must be planned in such a way that
firms would not be able to take advantage of one another.201 Clark also noted that
the degree of specialization of high volume machinery exacerbated coordination
problems and the ability of firms to behave strategically in buying and selling.
These would be lessened to the extent that machines are adaptable to changing
production. “In some cases, however, a change in the product calls for large
investments in new equipment.”202 Nevertheless, the “regularizing of renewals and
extensions” is “an ever-present need”203 Finally, vertical integration into consumer
sales would likely produce dealers that have a “much more complete harmony of
interest with the producer,” thus making them more effective resellers.204
Clark also observed that “[n]ot all the forces are working in the direction of
integration.”205 Economies of scale may incline a firm not to integrate into a market
where its own needs would be too small to yield efficient production.206 Also
cutting against vertical integration was specialization held by other firms, which
would operate in areas where trained producers could do something better than a
firm could do it internally.207
The opening sentence in an important article by Klein, Crawford, and Alchian in
the 1970s acknowledges “Coase’s fundamental insight that transaction,
coordination, and contracting costs must be considered explicitly in explaining the
extent of vertical integration.”208 The authors do not mention Clark, but he had, in
fact, developed a comprehensive theory fifteen years earlier that contracting and
coordination costs determine when a firm will choose outside procurement or
internal production. These choices related entirely to the firm’s search to maximize

197. Id. at 137.
198. Id. at 119–22.
199. Id. at 399–400.
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201. Id. at 137–38.
202. Id. at 138.
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205. Id. at 140.
206. Id. at 139.
207. Id. at 140–41.
208. Klein et al., supra note 190, at 297.
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its own value within an environment that included fixed costs and specialization, as
well as shortness of information about the positions of bargaining partners. Clark’s
analysis was not tied into as neat a package as that of Coase, but the fundamental
theory was the same.
Clark’s Overhead Costs, just as much as Coase’s Nature of the Firm, broke the
business firm apart and explored its inner decision making. For both, the premise
was that managers set out to maximize the firm’s value. In that sense Clark’s
Overhead Costs was firmly marginalist just as it was firmly institutionalist. While
Coase’s Nature of the Firm is given considerable credit for producing nonmonopolistic explanations for business decisions, Clark’s Overhead Costs did the
same thing—pointing out, for example, that pricing above short run cost and price
discrimination are not unique attributes of monopoly, but can exist in any market
with fixed costs.209 The pervasive theme of Overhead Costs is that many of the
pricing anomalies that represented deviations from perfect competition in fact had
completely nonmonopolistic explanations when durable fixed-cost investment was
relatively high.
As Harvard’s T.H. Sanders wrote in a review, Clark’s discussion addressed the
problem of those “little boxes” that had characterized neoclassical discussions of
microeconomics.210 More particularly, Clark raised the question whether “the
experiences of the individual firm [are] of interest to the economist; or is he
concerned only with the generalizations which can reliably be made from the
observation of many individuals firms?”211
E. Pigou, Kaldor, and Robinson: the Firm in Equilibrium
Pigou, who later became Coase’s frequent target, wrote an important article on
the “equilibrium firm” in the late 1920s.212 Pigou’s focus, unlike Coase’s, was
mainly on horizontal size rather than vertical integration. Pigou showed that when
the supply price of the industry is greater than the marginal cost of the individual
firm, that firm will tend to expand until the two are equalized. When the industry’s
supply price is lower than the firm’s costs the firm will contract. As a result, the
only firm that is in equilibrium (assuming that the market as a whole is in
equilibrium) is the one whose marginal cost equals the industry supply price.213
Pigou’s article related expansion directly to cost, although it did not distinguish
transaction costs from other kinds of costs. In an important article on firm
equilibrium, Nicholas Kaldor added to this that the size of firms is limited to the
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210. T.H. Sanders, Clark’s Economics of Overhead Costs, 38 Q.J. ECON. 487, 490
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212. A.C. Pigou, An Analysis of Supply, 38 ECON. J. 238 (1928); see also Piero Sraffa,
The Laws of Costs Under Competitive Conditions, 36 ECON. J. 535 (1926) (explaining that
under competition market-wide costs are generally constant).
213. Pigou elaborated on this work in The Economics of Welfare. PIGOU, supra note 4,
pt. II, ch. 11, §§ 3–12.
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extent that production costs rise.214 Once the firm’s costs equal those of the market,
the firm will no longer grow.215
In 1931, Cambridge economist E.A.G. Robinson published his seminal book on
industrial organization, The Structure of Competitive Industry. Robinson’s book
looked beyond the individual plant to problems of management.216 When Pigou and
Kaldor spoke of costs they generally assumed a firm that operated a single plant.
Just as production, management was also subject to both economies and
diseconomies of scale.217 Management costs differed from plant-specific costs,
however, in that they applied to the firm as a whole.218 To the extent that
management costs per unit rose as firms grew in size, these costs placed a limit
even on the size of multi-plant firms. Only by taking management as well as firmspecific production costs into account could one come up with a limiting measure
on firm size.219
The work done by Pigou, Kaldor, and Robinson were exercises in pure
marginalism, not empirical studies of firms. With increasing degrees of complexity,
they related the size of a firm to its increasing internal costs of production and
management, as opposed to the supply costs of the market as a whole, which were
presumed to be constant.220 For example, if market supply costs were a constant
$10 per unit, a firm whose current costs were $8 per unit would grow until its own
costs rose to $10, but not further. Alternatively, a firm whose costs exceeded $10
would contract until its costs fell. A firm would be in equilibrium when its own
costs precisely equaled the costs of the market as a whole.
Given these contributions, Coase certainly exaggerated in the opening
paragraphs of The Nature of the Firm, when he suggested that his paper was the
first to define the scope of the firm by using a theory of marginal substitution.221
The work done by Pigou, Kaldor, and Robinson all related the size of a firm to its
marginal costs as opposed to those of the market as a whole, and found equilibrium
at the point where firm costs and market costs were in equipoise. What Coase
added was a critical tool for determining how firms grow with a higher degree of
specificity. He simply observed that markets themselves are costly, and firms are
always seeking to minimize costs. As long as the marginal costs of internal
production are lower than the marginal costs of using the market, the firm will
produce internally, and vice-versa. Coase’s analysis applied to every decision a
firm made, from relatively “macro” decisions about whether or not to build a new
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plant to extremely “micro” decisions about whether to sweep one’s own floors
rather than hiring a cleaning service, or whether to hire an employee lawyer or
engage outside counsel.222
At the same time, for all of Coase’s subsequent rhetoric about actual observation
and the real world,223 very little in The Nature of the Firm concerns empirical
observations about anything. In fact, Coase’s mode of analysis was the same as that
of his neoclassical predecessors. He assumed that the firm seeks to maximize its
value and that both internal production and markets impose costs, but that these
costs are not necessarily the same. A firm directs its activities between internal
production and external procurement until, at the margin, the value of one equals
the value of the other. Coase never “verified” this conclusion and did not need to:
as was the case for Clark’s work on fixed costs, Pigou’s theory of the equilibrium
firm, or Robinson’s theory of management costs, Coase’s conclusions flowed
precisely from marginalism plus the neoclassical theory that the firm is a
maximizer of its own value. As Coase concluded:
To determine the size of the firm, we have to consider the marketing
costs (that is, the costs of using the price mechanism), and the costs of
organizing of different entrepreneuers and then we can determine how
many products will be produced by each firm and how much of each it
will produce.224
Coase’s only attempt to provide some real world verisimilitude to this powerful
theory was a concluding discussion of the law of master and servant. Relying on
English lawyer Francis Raleigh Batt’s treatise on employment law, Coase observed
that the common law distinguished between market relationships and agency, or
command and control relationships such as those between employer or manager
and employee.225 Coase later wrote at some length about the composition of The
Nature of the Firm, even suggesting that it was a kind of empirical exercise for
which he initially collected data during visits to various manufacturing plants on a
trip to the United States.226 That visit may well have inspired Coase to write what
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he did, but his famous essay contains very little in the way of verification or even
casual observation of business firm decision making.
Lest this be regarded as critical of Coase’s influential article, it bears mention
that Coase was absolutely clear from the beginning about what he was doing. He
wanted to produce a tractable definition of the firm that could be derived by “two
of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the
idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of substitution
at the margin.”227 Whatever methodology was contained in The Nature of the Firm,
it was clearly not the kind of empirical and historical investigation envisioned by
the first generation of institutionalists.228
CONCLUSION: FROM COASEAN INSTITUTIONALISM TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
Within neoclassical economics prior to Pigou, resources were generally assumed
to be unambiguously assigned and costlessly traded. In that regime the need for a
legal system was limited to the enforcement of contracts, prohibition of fraud, and
control of monopoly. Except for the concern about monopoly, the neoclassicists did
not trouble themselves all that much about the interaction of the legal system and
the market. The rise of institutionalist economics in the early twentieth century
changed that, as the early institutionalists examined the many forms of nonmarket
organization through which resources move.229
Today, the Coasean vision of the relationship between institutions and law has
very largely swept the field. Within economics itself, New Institutional Economics
(NIE) accounts for an important portion of the work that is done; it is largely
considered to be in the mainstream, as evidenced by the Nobel Prize given in 2009
to Oliver E. Williamson, its best-known advocate.230 NIE shares in common with
old institutionalism the view that organizations and institutions differ from
neoclassical markets and thus are worth studying. Within this paradigm,
“organizations” are associational bodies of people that have a set of management
rules that control their decisions.231 Good examples are corporations or other
business firms, governments, and clubs. “Institutions” are the sets of rules that
define how decisions are made within any organization. These rules can be both
formal and informal; they can have the force of law or simply of custom, habit, or
mutual recognition. The common law, price theory, parental controls over children,
corporate voting structure, or the cloture rules of the United States Senate are all
examples.232
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This creation of a new institutionalism within neoclassicism has done two things
at once. First, it has enabled institutionalism as a theory to have more coherence
and explanatory power than the old institutionalism had. Indeed, one of the most
devastating critiques of the old institutionalism was that it quickly turned into little
more than historical description, offering very little analytic power.233
But the other thing that NIE has done is much more constraining. Economics is
fundamentally about producing value through the creation and movement of
resources. Under the constraints of marginalism and ordinalism, however, only a
small subset of resource movements can be defended as socially beneficial. More
fundamentally, only a small subset of such movements is thought to be within the
domain of scientific economics. First are individual preference orderings and
voluntary exchange. A voluntary exchange necessarily increases value to both
parties (or at least, does not diminish the value to either). If an exchange affects no
one else, it meets even the strict Paretian efficiency requirements. Second is price
theory, which unlike welfare economics is concerned with the maximization of
value in monetary terms. Third is the structure and decision making of institutions,
including but not limited to the business firm. Whether regarded as an individual
economic actor or as a collection, the firm’s goal is to maximize its own value. One
thing that makes modern law and economics both insightful and controversial is
that this same goal, the maximization of value, is used to explain nonbusiness
institutions as well.
The principal effect of all of this has been to restrict the economic study of legal
institutions to the role of transaction costs; “transaction” is defined to include both
resource transfers that result from bargains between legally independent people and
nonmarket transfers that occur within the economic agent itself. The idea that the
cost of moving resources from one point to another is important to the assessment
of an economy hardly originated with Coase. It was very well developed in Pigou’s
work before Coase published anything.234 But writing as he did, prior to the
ordinalist revolution, Pigou had a much less “contract focused” theory about
welfare-increasing movements of resources. Pigou thus spoke more broadly than
Coase later did about state policies that redeployed resources from lower to higher
value uses.
By the time that The Problem of Social Cost was written the ordinalist victory in
neoclassical economics was complete.235 Coase’s 1960 article was concerned
almost entirely with the use of private transactions as resource movement
devices.236 Coase simply assumed that the domain of welfare-enhancing resource
movements was no broader than the domain of voluntary transactions. As a result,
the “resource movement” issue largely transformed itself into a “transaction cost”
issue.
It would be incorrect to describe the modern law and economics movement as a
merger of neoclassical economics with the economic institutionalism of the 1920s.
While the dominant branch of law and economics is neoclassical, it draws very
little from the first generation of institutionalists. Nevertheless, modern law and
Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 595 (2000).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 146–47.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 50–53.
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economics grew out of the premises that institutions count and that the legal system
is an essential institution for seeing to it that resources end up in their most valuable
use. Within law and economics, the initial assignment of property rights and the
transaction costs of bargaining are responsible for the creation of all economic
agents larger than the single individual. Every economic event becomes a study in
transaction costs. Transactions costs explain why the person who prefers the new
Toyota to her Chevrolet might nevertheless choose to stay with the car she already
has. They explain how large the business firm, the family, or some other institution
will become and how many activities it pursues internally rather than on a market.
In its most formal mode, transaction costs explain why people marry rather than
purchase sexual or domestic service, why they have children rather than hire
outside help, why sports teams are organized into conferences and how large the
conferences are, and why the common law is more efficient than legislation.
Marginalism and ordinalism were the ingredients that served to make the
Coasean brand of institutionalism, as well as its law and economics, very different
from the institutionalism of the pre-War years. They also explain why law and
economics to this day is defended by insiders and attacked by critics for taking
strong, free market, antistatist positions that are highly suspicious of involuntary
redistributions of wealth. This in turn may explain why more expansive variations,
such as so-called “behavioral” law and economics, have felt constrained to reject or
seriously modify marginalism as a fundamental principle of human motivation.237
When human motivation and action is understood in a broader and less formal way,
the rationale for institutions necessarily does the same.

237. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2001); LAW AND
ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES
(Margaret Oppenheimer & Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2005).

